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ALCHEMY AND PATENTABILITY: TECHNOLOGY, "USEFUL
ARTS," AND THE CHIMERICAL MIND-MACHINE
LAURA R. FORD*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 7, 2005, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly
to reject the Council of the European Union's common position for
adoption of a European Directive on the Patentability of Computer-
Implemented Inventions (Directive).' This decisive and historic ac-
tion on the part of the European Parliament finally brought an end to
protracted debate over the Directive, returning Europe to its uneasy
status quo with respect to the patentability of software and computer-
related inventions.2 However, based on the rhetoric that has accom-
panied the Directive since its introduction in 2002,1 it would appear
that there is little consensus as to what the status quo in Europe actu-
ally is.4 In fact, the only point of agreement amongst the participants
* 2005-2006 Intellectual Property and Huckabay Teaching Fellow, University of Wash-
ington. The author wishes to thank Lawrence Cunningham, Bob Ford, and Heinz Goddar for
their review and comments.
1. See Michael Rocard, No Directive on Software Patents, EUR. PARL. DAILY
NOTEBOOK, July 6, 2005. The vote was 648 to 14 for rejection, with 18 abstentions. Id.
2. See Intellectual Property: European Parliament Buries Software Patents Directive,
EUR. REP., July 9, 2005. The action is historic because it is the first time that the European
Parliament rejected a proposed directive at this relatively early stage, prior to a conciliation
procedure. See id. See infra notes 459-465, 473-479 and accompanying text for a description
of the relevant procedure for enactment of directives in the European Union.
3. See infra note 455 and accompanying text.
4. Organizations of European small businesses, as well as participants in the open
source software community, lobbied heavily against the Directive, arguing that its enactment
would stifle innovation and impose unnecessary costs on small businesses. See Andreas Gau-
ger & Marten Mickos, NoSoftwarePatents.Com Issues Call to Action, LINUX GRAM, Mar. 28,
2005; Lucia Kubosova, MEPs Draw Up Battle Lines for Software Patent Vote,
EUOBSERVER.COM, July 5, 2005. Statements on the part of such organizations and partici-
pants often indicated a belief that the Directive would inaugurate the granting of patents on
software and computer-related inventions in Europe. See Intellectual Property: European
Parliament Buries Software Patents Directive, supra note 2; NoSoftwarePatents. Com Issues
Call to Action, supra. In fact, the European Patent Office's Technical Board of Appeal has
1
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in the debate concerning the Directive seems to be this: to the extent
one can delineate a European approach to the patentability of software
and computer programs, that approach is different from the approach
in the United States of America and Japan and should remain so.'
The essence of the widely-perceived difference between the Euro-
pean approach and the American approach to patentability of software
and computer-related inventions is that, in the case of the former, such
patentability hinges on whether the invention has an identifiably
"technical character."6 In the case of America, on the other hand, re-
cent jurisprudence of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(Federal Circuit) indicates that patentability hinges on the sole re-
quirement of "usefulness."7 However, in the case of America, it is
important to remember that the Constitution of the United States of
America (Constitution) imposes a fundamental limitation on the legis-
lative power to enable patent grants, and this limitation is that patents
may only be granted where they "promote the Progress of ... useful
Arts." 8 Inferentially, then, the American Constitution imposes a limi-
upheld the granting of such patents by the European Patent Office since 1987, and this posi-
tion is generally followed in the United Kingdom and Germany. See Case T 208/84,
VICOM/Computer-Related Invention, [1987] E.P.O.R. 74, construed in In re Fujitsu Ltd.,
[1996] R.P.C. 511 (Pat.) (Eng.) [hereinafter VICOM]; Peter Mole & David Booton, The Ac-
tion Freezes? The Draft Directive on the Patentability of Computer Implemented Inventions,
3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 289, 296-302 (2002). Several commentators have indicated that, rather
than broaden the availability of patents for software and computer-related inventions, the Di-
rective would have slightly restricted such availability if adopted in the form proposed by the
Commission of the European Communities. See id.; Justin Hill, Computer-Implemented In-
ventions in Europe, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, June 1, 2005.
5. See EUR. PARL. Doc. (A6-0207) 11 (2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/prelex/
detaildossierreal.cfm?CL=en&Dosld=172020; ROBERT HART ET AL., REPORT TO THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION: STUDY CONTRACT ETD/99/B5-3000/E/106: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF PATENTABILITY OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS 6-8, 24 (1999), http://europa.eu.int/
comm/internal market/en/indprop/comp/study.pdf [hereinafter REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION].
6. See VICOM, [1987] E.P.O.R. at 74; EUR. PARL. DOC. (A6-0207) 11 (2005); REPORT
TOTHE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 24.
7. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State St. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). For a thorough
historical comparison of American and European approaches to software patentability, to
which this Article owes much despite taking a different approach and reaching different con-
clusions, see John T. Soma et al., Software Patents: A U.S. and E.U. Comparision [sic], 8 U.
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (2000).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The complete clause states that Congress shall have the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
At the time this clause was drafted, in the late eighteenth century, the term "science" had a
broader meaning than it does now, being roughly equivalent to terms like knowledge and
learning. See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 797 (C.T. Onions ed., 1966)
[hereinafter OXFORD DICTIONARY]. Thus, a widely accepted interpretation of this clause is
[Vol. 42
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tation on the field within which patents may be granted, and this field
is that of the "useful Arts."9
In his influential article, written the same year that the current
Patent Act was enacted in America, Robert Coulter argued that the
field of the useful arts is equivalent to the field of technology.'" This
standard was explicitly endorsed in the context of computer-related
inventions by the predecessor to the Federal Circuit, the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals (CCPA)."I According to Judge Rich, "[a]ll
that is necessary ... to make a sequence of operational steps a statu-
tory 'process' within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological
arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to pro-
mote the progress of 'useful arts.""' 2 Although the United States Su-
preme Court has never explicitly affirmed this standard, it has never
rejected it either. 3 Therefore, although American and European
that it represents a so-called "balanced sentence," which was commonly used at the time. See
Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts (Part II), 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 487,
491 (1952) [hereinafter Coulter Ill. According to such an interpretation, the terms "Science,"
"Authors," and "Writings" all relate to one another, in parallel to the relation of "useful Arts,"
"Inventors," and "Discoveries." See id. at 491-92. Powerful evidence for this interpretation
is provided by the title of the first patent act, The Patent Act of 1790, entitled An Act to Pro-
mote the Progress of Useful Arts. See id. at 490. The Patent Act of 1793, which replaced the
Patent Act of 1790, was also so entitled. See THOMAS G. FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW
OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS 193 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2003) (1810); see also
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100-01 (2d Cir. 1951); JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 402-03 (Carolina Aca-
demic Press 1987) (1833); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
9. Coulter II, supra note 8, at 487.
10. See Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts (Part 1), 34 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 417, 417-18 (1952) [hereinafter Coulter I]; Coulter 1H, supra note 8; Robert I. Coulter,
The Field of the Statutory UsefulArts (Part 111), 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 718, 737 (1952) [here-
inafter Coulter Ell]. For a discussion of Coulter's arguments as they pertain to computer pro-
grams, which thoroughly explores the nature of technology and the art of computer program-
ming, see Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419
(1999).
11. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (1970). Under the terms of the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered
portions of Title 28 of the United States Code), the appellate functions of the CCPA and the
United States Court of Claims were absorbed into a newly created Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, which assumed exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals subject to certain
limited exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000); Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 551-54 (2003).
12. Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893.
13. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 200-05 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As
noted by the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank & Trust Co., the Supreme Court has several
times cited Congressional Reports indicating Congress's intention that the terms "machine"
and "manufacture," as used in the Patent Act of 1952, include "anything under the sun that is
made by man." S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182; Diamond v. Chak-
rabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); see State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, although this detail is not often
3
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courts must address distinct doctrinal traditions when they render a de-
termination as to the patentability of software and computer-related
inventions, the essence of the problem they face is arguably the same:
defining the boundary around what may be considered technical or
technological.
The computer poses fundamental challenges to traditional defini-
tions of technology because it combines attributes of the human mind
with those of a machine and because the end results of its activities in-
extricably combine the physical realm of hardware and the symbolic
realm of software. As the computer assumes an ever-expanding array
of responsibilities traditionally performed by human beings, the diffi-
culty of distinguishing between human beings and the technology of
which they make use increases. In such a setting, moreover, determi-
nations of patentability have broader social implications than have
traditionally been acknowledged within the relatively insular world of
patent examiners, attorneys, and judges.
The purpose of this Article is to trace the development of Ameri-
can and European jurisprudence pertaining to the patentability of
software and computer-related inventions, viewing resultant doctrines
as an accretion of attempts by various persons acting within differing
historical contexts to define the boundaries of patentable technology.
Such a historical exercise is useful, not only in demonstrating how the
doctrine has come to be what it is, but also to demonstrate the difficul-
ties faced by judges seeking to delineate patentability boundaries. The
basic argument made in this Article is that the challenging patentabil-
ity questions raised by computers and computer-related inventions
should be addressed directly through careful consideration of the na-
ture of technology. Currently, European jurisprudence is closer to en-
gaging in such a consideration than American jurisprudence, by virtue
of the technical character requirement. However, pressures to remain
competitive with America and Japan threaten to make this require-
ment a mere formality. In America, it is essential that we engage in a
discussion as to the constitutional boundaries of patentable technol-
ogy. It is not enough to say that because distinctions are difficult to
make, they should not be made.
noted, the legislative history speaks only to the terms machine and manufacture, not to the
entirety of section 101 of the Patent Act. See S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 ("A person may have
'invented' a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is
made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of
the title are fulfilled."). And in any case, such phraseology clearly does not (and moreover
cannot) define Congress's power under the Constitution, but rather merely purports to address
Congress's legislative intention. See id. at 2398-99.
[Vol. 42
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II. THE CHIMERICAL MIND-MACHINE AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL ARTS
A. The Nature of Computers and Their Programs
General purpose computers, operating under the direction of soft-
ware programs, constitute a chimerical creature, combining attributes
of the human mind with attributes of a mindless machine. 4 At a basic
level, general purpose computers are comprised of a central process-
ing unit, memory, and peripherals (monitor, keyboard, printer, ports,
and drives). 5 The machine's central processing unit can only process
information according to a strict two-value (binary) logic system, and
it really only understands two things: on or off.16 Nevertheless, accu-
mulated layers of innovation enabling translation between human-
comprehensible programming languages and binary logic, combined
with architectural innovations enabling increased speed and memory
capacity, make it relatively easy to instruct the computer to perform a
multitude of tasks traditionally performed by human beings. 7 Once
these instructions have been effectively broken down into the com-
puter's binary language, the machine performs many of these tasks
with a speed and accuracy that far surpasses human beings. Although
computers still cannot match human beings in certain areas, which
might be variously described as common sense, intuition, or fuzzy
logic, advances in the field of heuristics have made it possible to teach
computers to learn.' 8 In some computers, memory is organized to imi-
tate the behavior of neurons in the human brain. 19
14. See GREGORY J.E. RAWLINS, SLAVES OF THE MACHINE: THE QUICKENING OF
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 1-20 (1997). The chimera (chimxra) was a mutant creature of
Greek mythology, which breathed fire and was variously described as a combination of lion,
goat, dragon, and snake. See WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, CHIMERA (CREATURE),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chimera. See generally THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH'S
MYTHOLOGY 117 (Modern Library ed. 1993) (1855).
15. See WILLIAM STALLINGS, COMPUTER ORGANIZATION AND ARCHITECTURE:
DESIGNING FOR PERFORMANCE 5-10 (5th ed. 2000); GARY STIX & MIRIAM LACOB, WHO GIVES
AGIGABYTE? 17-19 (1999).
16. See STIX & LACOB, supra note 15, at 12-14. See generally STALUNGS, supra note
15, at 27-28, 696-97. The first on/off switches were provided by vacuum tubes; but, after
World War II, use of electricity was enabled by the discovery of substances (such as silicon)
with properties that made them somewhat muted conductors of electricity, or "semi-
conductors." See id. at 14-17, 24-29. With the use of electricity, "on" is represented by a
closed electric circuit, and "off' is represented by an open circuit. See STIX & LACOB, supra
note 15, at 13.
17. See STIX & LACOB, supra note 15, at 19-24, 33-42.
18. See id. at 40-43, 46-49.
19. See id.
5
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Advances in the ease of use and functionality of computers can be
generally attributed to advances in two fields, which are only partially
distinct: hardware and software. 2' The hardware components of a
computer generally include all of the peripherals, the plastic casing of
the computer, and the physical interior (memory chips and central
processing unit).2 ' Conceptually, the hardware is comprised of the
physical mechanisms by which the computer processes, records, and
displays data: the switches (whether composed of vacuum tubes, elec-
tric circuits, or light), along with their attendant energy source, the
units of memory storage (currently silicon microchips), the monitor,
the keyboard, and the printer. Software, on the other hand, is the myr-
iad of programs that instruct the computer to perform various proc-
esses.12 The essence of these programs is symbolic language, ranging
from the simple, two-valued language of ones and zeros, to complex
programming languages, which must ultimately be translated into the
computer's binary language in order to perform their intended func-
tions.23
Computer programs are frequently conceptualized in terms of the
functions they enable the computer to perform (operating systems,
browsers, word processors, etc.), not the language of which they are
comprised or the processes they actually instruct the computer to per-
form. And, as soon as the function of a computer program is focused
upon, it becomes very difficult to distinguish between hardware and
software because the function is defined in terms of what human be-
ings observe as a result: a number, a sound, a document, a spread-
sheet, or a mechanical operation. These resulting functions have only
an indirect relationship to the mechanism by which the computer is
actually processing data and would be relatively difficult for the non-
specialist to locate within the programming code. For example, the
simple representation of the letter "L" on a monitor screen requires a
complicated interaction among software and hardware elements in
which the application (for example, a word processor), in accordance
with its programming, triggers the operating system to perform a pre-
programmed function that must be translated into the binary language
of the central processing unit, with the ultimate result being that sev-
eral of the pixels, arranged in a grid on the screen, are appropriately
illuminated.
20. See STALLINGS, supra note 15, at 19-35.
21. Seeid. at 53.
22. See id.
23. See id.; STix & LAcOB, supra note 15, at 33-40.
[Vol. 42
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This difficulty of distinguishing between software and hardware,
which is evident throughout the brief history in which patentability of
computer-related inventions has been explored, is closely related to
the much broader problem that arises in that context. This broader
problem becomes evident when we recognize the challenge that com-
puters pose to traditional classifications of knowledge and human en-
deavor. Ultimately, by combining attributes of the human mind with
those of a machine and symbolic logic with physical materials and
processes, computers fundamentally challenge the separation between
abstract realms of culture and social interaction and traditionally con-
crete realms of craft processes and tools.
B. Technological Versus Cultural and Social Arts
The men who participated in drafting the Constitution and the first
patent act in the United States (Patent Act of 1790) conceived of a
world in which the term "arts" captured within it various skills and
branches of learning.24 The realm of the arts was divisible into cul-
tural and useful arts, the former including liberal arts (grammar,
logic/dialectics, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy)
and fine arts (painting, drawing, architecture, sculpture, poetry, danc-
ing, and drama).25 Certain additional arts were treated as distinct cate-
gories not within the category of useful arts, such as the arts of teach-
ing (pedagogy), politics, war, and business.26 These latter arts could
be denominated together under the heading of "social arts" because
their essence lies in working with people rather than things and, in
working with such people, making complex judgments in the face of
uncertainty.27 The useful arts, then, comprised the "mysteries" of the
European craft guilds; these mysteries were processes and tools used
by trained human beings operating in the physical world to produce
24. See OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 52; Coulter 1I, supra note 8, at 493-94;
Durham, supra note 10, at 1424-26, 1429-37.
25. See Coulter I, supra note 8, at 494-97. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 454-74 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans.,
Harper & Row 1966) (1848).
26. See Coulter II, supra note 8, at 494-97.
27. According to Aristotelian categories, these areas of human activity were not com-
prised within the arts of material and technical production (techne-), which were concerned
with "making" and had an end other than themselves, but rather required excellence in action,
or "practical wisdom," which concerned itself with that which was best for human beings.
See N1COMACHEAN ETHICS (1894), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729-
31, 1800-06 (Jonathan Barnes ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1984); see also PAMELA 0. LONG,
OPENNESS, SECRECY, AUTHORSHIP: TECHNICAL ARTS AND THE CULTURE OF KNOWLEDGE FROM
ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE 2 (2001).
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physical objects generally regarded as being practically useful and
marketable to other human beings.28
Extrapolating from these traditional notions, two characteristics
might be stated to define the technological, or useful, arts. First, they
address themselves to means rather than ends.29 In other words, they
are primarily concerned with the processes and tools used to achieve a
result that is helpful in the lives of human beings, rather than the result
itself.30 Second, they primarily relate to the physical world of things,
28. See Coulter II, supra note 8, at 496-97. The craft (mestier, mysterie, art) guilds of
Europe can be viewed as representing a particular phase in the history of European organiza-
tions, with connections to organizational forms developed during the Roman Empire and util-
ized by the Church. See P.W. DUFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 103 (Augustus M.
Kelley 1971) (1938); GEORGE UNWIN, THE GILDS AND COMPANIES OF LONDON 92-126 (1908);
MAX WEBER, GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY 1-235 (Frank H. Knight trans., Dover Publica-
tions 2003) (1927) (compiling student notes from Weber's lectures given in winter 1919-1920
under the title Outlines of Universal Social and Economic History). In the City of London,
these craft guilds began to emerge and differentiate themselves from older fraternities, pri-
marily religious brotherhoods, seeking the ability to govern themselves under the City's su-
pervision, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. See CALENDAR OF LETTER BOOKS
PRESERVED AMONG THE ARCHIVES OF THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF LONDON AT THE
GUILDHALL, LETTER BOOK G, FOLIO cxxxv b (1364), summarized and translated in
CALENDAR OF LETTER BOOKS OF THE CITY OF LONDON (Reginald R. Sharpe ed., Univ. of Lon-
don & History of Parliament Trust 1909), available at http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/source.asp?pubid=172 ("Also it is ordained that all the misteries of the City be
lawfully ruled and governed, each in its kind, so that no deceit or false work be found therein
by good men elected and sworn from each mistery. And if any be rebellious against them let
him be fined and imprisoned in manner prescribed."); UNWIN, supra, at 92-126; SCRIVENERS'
COMPANY COMMON PAPER 1357-1628, ARTICLES ENROLLED IN GUILDHALL, 1357-92 (Francis
W. Steer ed., Univ. of London & History of Parliament Trust 1968), available at
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/source.asp?pubid= 152.
Item, it is ordained that all the crafts of the City of London should be loyally ruled
and governed, each according to its nature in the proper manner, so that no false-
hood nor wrong work nor deceit should be found in any kind of the said crafts, for
the honour of the good men of the said crafts; and that, for the common advantage of
the people, four or six [men] should be chosen and sworn from each craft, either
more or fewer according to the needs of the craft, which men so chosen and sworn
would have the full power of the Mayor to do and carry out this, well and loyally.
Id. The craft guilds were ultimately transformed through infiltration by merchants who
gained control by virtue of the fact that they were needed to sell the products created by the
craftsmen. See HAROLD G. Fox, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND
FUTURE OF THE PATENT MONOPOLY 37-38 (1947); WEBER, supra, at 136-61, 230-35.
29. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. Such a distinction is generally con-
sistent with the meaning accorded to the German word Technik by Max Weber. See MAX
WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of California Press 1978) (1968).
Weber distinguished Technik from "economic action" based on the argument that the former
is concerned with the means, and the latter with the end, of human activity. See id. at 65.
Thus a choice between alternative technologies constitutes a choice between two alternative
means to achieve a particular end. See id.
30. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. To take the relatively trivial exam-
ple of tooth-brushing, according to this distinction, the technological arts would include proc-
esses and tools for the brushing of teeth, not the result, which is (hopefully) clean teeth.
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rather than the social realm of human interaction or the cultural realm
of symbolic expression.3 Although the social and cultural arts can
undoubtedly be treated as useful means to achieving particular ends, 3 2
many would strongly protest that such arts should be treated as ends
rather than means.33 Any legal doctrine assuming the former treat-
ment, absent careful consideration of historical developments, social
implications, and political legitimacy, should be open to question.
C. The Struggle to Articulate a "Meta-Jurisprudence"
of Patentable Technology
With these basic conceptions of computer programs and the useful
arts as background, the struggle to delineate patentability rules appli-
cable to computer programs can be more fully appreciated. As will be
seen, the struggle played out differently in America and Europe, given
differing legal and historical contexts. In America, specific doctrinal
problems were presented by ambiguities concerning the patentability
of processes as opposed to machines. In Europe, specific doctrinal
difficulties can be attributed to the fact that basic patent law doctrines
were being radically altered, as a result of harmonization, at the same
time that computer-related inventions began to arise. Despite these
specific differences, however, the fundamental problem of defining
patentable technology runs through jurisprudential developments in
both regions; in addition to addressing specific doctrinal contexts,
judges were forced to address this more fundamental problem, albeit
sometimes implicitly. As a result, European and American judges
have subtly shaped a meta-jurisprudence of technology and patentabil-
ity containing parallels that are often striking given the significant
contextual differences. 34
31. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text; EUGEN VON BOHM-BAWERK, THE
POSITIVE THEORY OF CAPITAL I.I. 1 (William A. Smart trans., Macmillan & Co. 1891) (1888)
(stating that "[tihe end and aim of all production is the making of things with which to satisfy
our wants," and that in order to produce these things, we humans "combine our own natural
powers and natural powers of the external world in such a way that, Under natural law, the
desired material good must come into existence").
32. Weber stated that social relationships may be "valued as a potential source of pre-
sent or future disposal over utilities," which he essentially defined to include all economic
advantages useful in achieving economic ends. WEBER, supra note 29, at 68-69. Therefore,
social relationships may be viewed as a means to an economic end and might arguably be in-
cluded within Weber's broad definition of Technik.
33. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 25, at 459-68, 470-77.
34. The Greek prefix "meta" generally denotes that which goes beyond, or transcends,
corresponding to the Latin prefix "trans." See OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 572-73.
In computer science, it can denote a more fundamental level of analysis, as in "meta-data,"
meaning "data about the data." See WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, METADATA,
2005]
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III. THE AMERICAN STRUGGLE
A. The Problem of "Processes" in American Patentability
Jurisprudence (1790-1968)
The Patent Act of 1790 provided for the patentability of "any use-
ful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement
therein."35 The Patent Act of 1793 retained these basic categories of
patentable subject matter, while adding novelty as an explicit require-
ment for patentability;3 6 and, the Patent Act of 1836 retained such
categories and the novelty requirement, while introducing a Patent Of-
fice37 and an examination of patentability prior to the grant of a pat-
ent.3 8 Despite such legislative continuity in defining patentable sub-
ject matter, the term art, as used in these various patent acts, presented
early interpretive problems for the Supreme Court.39 Ironically, it was
a patent claim pertaining to the electro-magnetic telegraph, an inven-
tion that bears haunting resemblances to modern computers and their
worldwide interaction via the internet, 4° which prompted the Court to
implicitly limit the statutory term art to the extent of process. 41 Con-
gress adopted this limitation in the Patent Act of 195242 (1952 Patent
Act), replacing the term art with the term process.43
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metadata.
35. See Coulter II, supra note 8, at 500.
36. Id.; FESSENDEN, supra note 8, at 193 (stating that the Patent Act of 1793 provided
for the granting of patents for "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, not known or used before the application").
37. See Coulter I, supra note 8, at 500.
38. See Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 270 (1854).
39. See id. at 267-68; O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 118-20, 130-34 (1854).
40. At a basic level, the internet is a global network of computers, which are connected
through the international telecommunications infrastructure. See STIX & LACOB, supra note
15, at 53-55, 68-75. What most people think of as the internet is really the World Wide Web,
which is made possible through the development of a family of programming languages based
on the original hypertext markup language (HTML), as well as programs designed to recog-
nize the "tags" created through such languages; such programs include browsers that create
images on a computer screen and cause the computer to perform other functions in accor-
dance with the instructions contained within HTML tags, and search engines that locate data
housed on network servers located around the world. See id. at 75-77.
41. See O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 118-20. The Court's limitation becomes clear upon reading
the opinion of the dissenting Justices, who would have defined art more broadly to encompass
an entire field of activity that might be created upon the discovery of a new application of a
principle or law of nature. See id. at 128-35 (Grier, J., dissenting); see also I.e Roy v.
Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852).
42. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-
293 (2000)).
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
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The early Supreme Court cases establishing the limitation of pat-
entable statutory arts to processes, or methods, were founded upon a
conceptual differentiation of (1) abstract principles, or laws of nature;
(2) the means (processes or machines) embodying such principles that
are used to achieve a result that is useful for human beings; and (3) the
results achieved through the use of such means.' Only the second of
these was regarded as constituting patentable subject matter.45 More-
over, the Court explicitly recognized a danger inherent in claims
stated in terms of processes, which was their tendency to easily con-
flate into a claim on either a principle or a functional result.46 For this
reason, the Court viewed the precision of the patent specification as
being particularly important in the case of processes in order to keep
the patent firmly tethered to patentable subject matter (that is to limit
the scope of the patent) and to provide notice to others as to the
boundaries over which they might not cross in seeking to accomplish
the same result or apply the same principle. 47  Thus, in the case of
processes, a "written description requirement" was connected at an
early stage to the question of patentability, particularly to differentiate
patentable processes from unpatentable principles.48
Early decisions restricted the definition of a process to a series of
physical actions or reactions, emphasizing that it is only "when the
term process is used to represent the means or method of producing a
result that it is patentable. ' 49 The Court cautioned against reading the
term process in a "vague sense" whereby the term passively describes
"the function of a machine, or the effect produced by it on the material
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this ti-
tle."); S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952).
44. Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175; see Corning, 56 U.S. at 267-69; O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 115-19.
45. Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 175-76; see O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 112-21.
48. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 118. Even in the case of machines, the tendency of patent at-
torneys to draft claims in abstract terms led the Court to emphasize the role of the specifica-
tion in determining patentability. See Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 531, 570-72 (1863).
49. Corning, 56 U.S. at 267-68.
An art may require one or more processes or machines in order to produce a cer-
tain result or manufacture. The term machine includes every mechanical device or
combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and pro-
duce a certain effect or result. But where the result or effect is produced by
chemical action, by the operation or application of some element or power of na-
ture, or of one substance to another, such modes, methods, or operations, are called
processes.
Id. at 267.
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subjected to the action of the machine."5 According to the Court,
reading the term process in this vague sense would permit a person to
patent the "function or abstract effect of a machine," which was
clearly prohibited.51
This prohibition against patenting the function of a machine is
closely related to another doctrine that prohibited as functional claims
describing an invention in terms of its function in order to capture as
many devices or mechanisms as possible, including devices or mecha-
nisms that the patentee might not even be familiar with or under-
stand.52 In the 1952 Patent Act, Congress amended this doctrine by
including in section 11213 the following paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure,
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the speci-
fication and equivalents thereof.
54
Thus, the "means-plus-function" claim was born.55  Outside of this
legislative exception, however, courts continued to state that "func-
tional statements in a claim cannot be relied on to endow the claim
with patentable subject matter" 6 and to treat the early cases prohibit-
ing functional claims as vital.57
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court continued to reiterate that neither
principles 58 nor the function of a machine 59 are patentable. Neverthe-
less, definitions of patentable processes tended to broaden over time. 60
50. Id. at 268.
51. See id.
52. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 8-9, 12-13 (1946);
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371-73 (1938); Holland Furniture
Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 256-58 (1928).
53. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
54. See Edward D. Manzo, "Means" Claims in Patent Infringement Litigation, 68 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 97,99 (1986).
55. See id. at 99.
56. In re Krodel, 223 F.2d 285, 288 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
57. See id. at 289.
58. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 724 (1880); Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
531, 568, 570 (1863).
59. See Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 383-86 (1909); Boyden Power-
Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 554-57 (1898); Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works
v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68, 79 (1895); Burr, 68 U.S. at 568-70. Lower courts continued to cite
the "function of machine" doctrine up through the 1950s. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 196 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. See Expanded Metal Co., 214 U.S. at 383-86; Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 728-29; Coch-
rane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876). In Tilghman, the Court acknowledged precedent
establishing that only the means used to effectuate a functional result are patentable, but
[Vol. 42
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Even the broader definitions, however, emphasized some physical ac-
tion as characteristic of patentable processes; in Cochrane v. Deener,61
the Court defined a patentable process as "an act, or a series of acts,
performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a
different state or thing. '62 This language was interpreted to mean that
a physical transformation of materials is necessary in order for a proc-
ess to be patentable. 63  And so, when lower courts faced process
claims that described processes of human thought or mental opera-
tions, they denied patentability on the basis that such claims did not
describe a physical process of transformation, but described only cer-
tain mental steps. Where a process was essentially comprised of men-
tal steps,64 or where the only novel aspect of a process lay in a particu-
lar mental step,65 patentability was routinely denied. By the early
1950s, a prohibition against patenting mental steps was regarded as
settled doctrine.66
added that "everything turns on the force and meaning of the word 'means."' Tilghman, 102
U.S. at 728. The Court further stated:
It is very certain that the means need not be a machine, or an apparatus; it may, as
the court says, be a process. A machine is a thing. A process is an act, or a mode
of acting. The one is visible to the eye,-an object of perpetual observation. The
other is a conception of the mind, seen only by its effects when being executed or
performed. Either may be the means of producing a useful result.
Id.
61. Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 780.
62. Id. at 788.
63. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. See In re Bolongaro, 62 F.2d 1059 (C.C.P.A. 1933). The invention in this case re-
lated to a method of producing a printed publication from a manuscript, involving a mathe-
matical determination of the number of "letter spaces" for a given printed publication, divid-
ing this by the number of lines in the publication to determine a "space factor per line" and
using this to determine the printed layout of a given manuscript. Id. at 1059-60. Finding no
cases "exactly in point," the court nevertheless found that the case
more nearly approaches that line of cases in which the subject-matter has been
held not patentable, and which has been referred to as including "a method of
transacting business, a form of contract, a mode of procedure, a rule of conduct, a
principle or idea, or a permissive function, predicated upon a thing involving no
structural law.
Id. at 1060.
65. See In re Heritage, 150 F.2d 554 (C.C.P.A. 1945). The invention in this case related
to a method of producing coated fiber boards "without materially impairing their porosity or
acoustic properties." Id. at 555. The specific methodology sought to be patented concerned
testing pre-fabricated and differentially coated fiber boards to determine the ideal amount of
coating for a particular desired acoustic quality. Id. at 555-56. The court held that the only
novel aspect of the invention was "the mental process of making a selection of the amount of
coating material to be used in accordance with a predetermined system" and that "[s]uch
purely mental acts are not proper subject matter for protection under the patent statutes." Id.
at 556.
66. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 195-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377,
380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) ("This court has deemed it to have been thoroughly established by deci-
13
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It was at this moment in time that the computer made its commer-
cial debut.67  By 1965, the computer had been miniaturized, 68 and its
potential impact on society was becoming apparent. 69  That year,
President Johnson appointed a commission to review the American
patent system and issue recommendations.7" The report of the com-
mission issued in December 196671 and, among its many recommen-
dations, included a pragmatically-focused recommendation that pat-
ents not be extended to computer programs.72  Based on such
recommendations, as well as contemporary understanding of Ameri-
can patentability doctrine, in1968 the U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice (USPTO) promulgated patentability guidelines that generally de-
nied patentability to computer programs, whether claimed as machines
or as processes.73
sions of various courts that purely mental steps do not form a process which falls within the
scope of patentability as defined by statute."); In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A.
1951) ("Citation of authority in support of the principle that claims to mental concepts which
constitute the very substance of an alleged invention are not patentable is unnecessary. It is
self-evident that thought is not patentable.").
67. See STALLINGS, supra note 15, at 25. The first commercially successful computer
was the UNIVAC I, which the United States Bureau of the Census purchased to perform cer-
tain calculations for the 1950 census. See id. IBM's first electronic computer, the 701, be-
came available in 1953. See id. at 33-34.
68. See id. at 24-32. The first "minicomputer," named to evoke the miniskirt, was mar-
keted by the Digital Equipment Corporation as the PDP-8. See id. at 34. Its price was ap-
proximately $16,000. See id.
69. See Gabriel P. Katona, Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 47 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 955, 955-56 (1965); The Cybernated Generation, TIME, Apr. 2, 1965, at 84 ("Just out
of its teens, the computer is beginning to affect the very fabric of society, kindling both won-
der and widespread apprehension .... [Siwept forward by a great wave of technology, of
which the computer is the ultimate expression, human society is surely headed for some deep-
reaching changes.").
70. See Gerald D. O'Brien, An Appraisal of the Report of the President's Commission
on the Patent System, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 139, 139 (1967).
71. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Releasing the Report of
the Commission, in 2 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1731, 1752 (1966).
72. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE PATENT SYS., "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF ...
USEFUL ARTS": IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 13 (1966). The report focused on the
limited capacity of the Patent Office to conduct reliable prior art searches. See id. The report
pointedly noted that copyright protection was available for computer programs and that "the
creation of programs has undergone substantial and satisfactory growth in the absence of pat-
ent protection." Id.
73. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 197-98 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Ex-
amination of Patent Applications on Computer Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 15,609, 15,610 (Oct.
22, 1968) ("The basic principle to be applied is that computer programming per se, whether
defined in the form of process or apparatus, shall not be patentable."). The USPTO left open
the possibility that where a computer program constituted just one component of an otherwise
patentable process that produced a physical result and combined non-obvious elements, pat-
entability would not be denied. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 197-98.
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But, 1968 was the year that the CCPA seized the opportunity to
weigh in on the question of computer program patentability,74 which it
accomplished with the subtlety of the proverbial bull in the china
closet. By 1970, the line of cases establishing the function of machine
doctrine had been summarily dismissed as "the product of an essen-
tially illogical distinction unwarranted by, and at odds with, the basic
purposes of the patent system and productive of a range of undesirable
results from the harshly inequitable to the silly."75 Ironically, although
it was of more recent vintage, the mental steps doctrine proved more
difficult to eliminate, requiring three decisions7 6 by the CCPA. Never-
theless, the CCPA managed, over the strident objections of the
USPTO, to eliminate the mental steps doctrine.77 In the process, how-
ever, a jurisprudential morass was created, into which the Supreme
Court would later step at its peril.
B. Prater and Musgrave: Eliminating the Mental Steps
Doctrine (1968-1970)
The first case to squarely raise the question of computer program
patentability was In re Prater.78 The invention at the heart of Prater79
constituted both a process and a machine to analyze and determine the
chemical elements, including their respective concentrations, in a par-
ticular chemical composition.80 The alleged novel and non-obvious
aspect of the invention related to a particular "systematic method" of
determining the subset of equations that would generate numerical
concentration values with the least "error amplification." 8' While the
machine specified in the application as implementing the claimed
process was a "special-purpose analog device, ' '82 the claim itself was
drafted in means-plus-function form,83 and the specification disclosed
74. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 194-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378
(C.C.P.A. 1968) [hereinafter Prater I], modified on reh'g, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969)
[hereinafter Prater 11]; In re Tarczy-Homoch, 397 F.2d 856, 866-67 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
75. Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d at 866-67.
76. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Prater , 415 F.2d 1378.
77. See Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882.
78. Praterl, 415 F.2d 1378.
79. Prater, without the distinction of Prater I or Prater I, refers to the entire contro-
versy, including the Prater I and Prater II decisions, as well as the determinations of the
USPTO.
80. Praterll, 415 F.2d at 1395.
81. Id. at 1396.
82. Id. at 1396-97.
83. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
2005]
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a "general-purpose digital computer" as an equivalent device for im-
plementing the process. 4 The examiner in the USPTO rejected the
process claims as not comprising patentable subject matter, relying on
the mental steps doctrine, and the Board of Appeals affirmed this re-
jection.85 The examiner rejected the machine claim because it encom-
passed a general-purpose digital computer applying principles of
mathematics; because the computer itself could not be novel, an
analogous machine performing the same mathematic calculations
would be obvious. 86 This reasoning was affirmed by the Board of Ap-
peals.87
The first Prater opinion (Prater I) was authored by Judge Smith
and focused on a complete rejection of the notion that the patentability
of process claims hinged on whether such processes "operate physi-
cally upon substances. 88 Judge Smith attributed this rejected notion
to a misunderstanding of Cochrane v. Deener,89 arguing that the inten-
tion of Cochrane "was not to limit process patentability[,] but to point
out that a process is not limited to the means used in performing it." 9°
Furthermore, Judge Smith argued that Tilghman v. Proctor9" had ex-
tended Cochrane by referring to a process as "a conception of the
mind, seen only by its effects when being executed or performed," 92
thus "focus[ing] attention on the mental aspect of process inventions
whose patentability we presently determine under the express provi-
sions of the Patent Act of 1952." 91 To Judge Smith, it was clear that
process claims necessarily describe mental steps and that this had
been recognized by the Supreme Court in Tilghman and incorporated
by Congress into the 1952 Patent Act.94 Therefore, the mental steps
84. See Prater 1l, 415 F.2d at 1397.
85. See id. at 1398. The examiner reasoned that the only physical steps involved in the
process would involve writing on paper and that most aspects of the process would be carried
out through mental calculations. Therefore, the only novel aspect of the invention related to
the calculations themselves, which did not constitute patentable subject matter because they
were mental acts. Id. The Board agreed, stating further that it was "beside the point that the
solution of the mathematical problem can be done by machine. The claims has [sic] set forth
nothing which cannot be performed purely as a mental exercise." Id.
86. Id. at 1399.
87. See id.
88. See Prater 1, 415 F.2d at 1387-89.
89. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876). See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying
text.
90. Prater 1, 415 F.2d at 1388.
91. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). See supra notes 58-63 and accompany-
ing text.
92. Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 728.
93. Prater 1, 415 F.2d at 1388.
94. See id. at 1387-89.
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doctrine was based on a misunderstanding of precedent and properly
rejected.9 5 Furthermore, because the rejection of the machine claim
had been based on analogous reasoning, and no references had been
cited to defeat the novelty or non-obviousness of the machine, Judge
Smith reversed the examiner's rejection of that claim as well.96
Unfortunately, Judge Smith died on the same day his opinion is-
sued, November 20, 1968; the opinion was joined by two other judges
of the CCPA.97 The court published the opinion, but simultaneously
granted a petition for rehearing.98 A blistering dissent from the grant
of rehearing was authored by Judge Rich and joined by Judge Al-
mond.99 Judge Rich argued that a decision to allocate additional re-
sources to the Prater case would divert scarce resources from other
pending matters.'00 Moreover, in Judge Rich's opinion, the only rea-
son the solicitor of the USPTO was urging rehearing was due to the
USPTO's dislike of the Prater I outcome.10 1 Noting the "disrespectful
[] tone" of the petition authored by the solicitor, Judge Rich stated:
Rehearing at this time can serve only to foster uncertainty in the law, to
encourage the Patent Office in its policy of refusing to follow what this
reviewing court has now declared the law to be and to have been at least
since 1952, and to prolong the controversy about what the law is. 162
Adding to the confusion and controversy, the second Prater opin-
ion (Prater II), authored by Judge Baldwin, reversed the outcome of
Prater I with respect to the process claims, affirming the USPTO's re-
95. See id. at 1388-89. Judge Smith also devoted a large share of his opinion to an
analysis of In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951), which the patent examiner had
relied on heavily in rejecting the process claims at issue in Prater. See Prater I, 415 F.2d at
1382-86. Specifically, Judge Smith sought to debunk the notion that the CCPA in Abrams
had adopted certain rules specified by Abrams' attorney for determining whether a process
claim should be rejected under the mental steps doctrine. See id. at 1386. These rules sought
to direct a court's attention to the presence of physical, as well as mental, aspects of a process
claim. The rules would also direct a court to reject claims involving mental steps unless the
claim embodied "both positive and physical steps as well as so-called mental steps," since
novelty "reside[d] in" such physical steps. See id. Judge Smith noted language from Abrams
wherein the court specifically stated that it was not adopting these rules as an analytical de-
vice. Id. While the Abrams court went on to support its holding by noting that it would fit
within the rules as devised by Abrams' attorney, Judge Smith argued that this had no prece-
dential effect and certainly could not be read as endorsing those rules for future jurispruden-
tial analysis. See id.
96. See id. at 1389.
97. See id. at 1390.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 1390-93.
100. See id. at 1392-93.
101. See id. at 1390-91.
102. Id. at 1390.
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jection of such claims. Based on his alternate analytical approach,
however, Judge Baldwin agreed with Judge Smith's conclusion in
Prater I that the USPTO's rejection of the machine claim should be
reversed. 03 Rather than directly attack the mental steps doctrine,
Judge Baldwin avoided it by arguing that the inclusion of a machine to
implement the process at issue in Prater distinguished the case from
prior cases where a process as disclosed could only be implemented
through the human mind." Noting that the two mental steps cases
primarily relied on by the examiner in Prater were decided prior to the
1952 Patent Act, and expressly reserving a decision on whether the
mental steps doctrine retained any vitality in the wake of that Act, 105
Judge Baldwin determined that the process claims at issue in Prater
failed for indefiniteness under section 112 of the Act. 106 According to
Judge Baldwin, by disclosing a machine capable of performing the
claimed process, the applicants had gone just far enough to take their
process claims outside the scope of the mental steps doctrine;1 7 how-
ever, because the claims were broad enough to encompass perform-
ance of the process by means other than the disclosed machine (that is,
by pencil and paper combined with human thought), they were not
sufficiently limited to implementation through the machine and there-
fore failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject
matter of the invention as required by section 112.108
Turning to the claim of the machine itself, Judge Baldwin found
no barrier to patentability.'°9 He flatly rejected the argument of the
USPTO that it would be obvious to program a general-purpose com-
puter to carry out the invention disclosed, characterizing this position
as "fatally defective in that it, in effect, assumes the existence as prior
art of appellants' discovery."' 10 If the purpose of the program itself
was not obvious, being not a matter of prior art, it would not be obvi-
103. See Prater 11, 415 F.2d at 1401-06.
104. See id. at 1401-05.
105. Id. at 1402. The two mental steps cases primarily relied upon by the examiner
were In re Yuan and In re Abrams. See supra note 66and accompanying text.
106. See Prater 11, 415 F.2d at 1405.
107. See id. at 1403.
Although in view of our decision here we find it unnecessary to analyze and/or re-
view in depth the so-called 'mental steps' doctrine, it would appear that the disclo-
sure of apparatus for performing the process wholly without human intervention
merely shows that the disclosed process does not fall within the so-called 'mental
steps' exclusion.
Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 1404-05.
109. See id. at 1405-06.
110. Id.
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ous to program a computer to carry out that purpose, according to
Judge Baldwin. 111 Furthermore, Judge Baldwin found no mental steps
problem in the claim of the machine because he interpreted the claim
as properly drafted in means-plus-function language, with sufficient
limitation to exclude human thought as an equivalent means.'
Therefore, the rejection of the machine claim was reversed. " 3
Thus, at the end of 1969, a mixed message was being sent with re-
spect to the patentability of computer programs. Only one year ear-
lier, the message was relatively clear, at least at the level of the
USPTO, that computer programs were not patentable whether claimed
as running on a machine or independently as a process."I4 However,
Prater II seemed to signal that such a program, if claimed as a ma-
chine programmed to carry out a non-obvious purpose, would be pat-
entable. 5 Moreover, the CCPA had taken the opportunity, in a foot-
note, to expressly signal patentability of both process and machine
(apparatus) claims that included computer programs.
No reason is now apparent to us why, based on the Constitution, statute, or
case law, apparatus and process claims broad enough to encompass the
operation of a programmed general-purpose digital computer are necessar-
ily unpatentable. In one sense, a general-purpose digital computer may be
regarded as but a storeroom of parts and/or electrical components. But
once a program has been introduced, the general-purpose digital computer
becomes a special-purpose digital computer (i.e., a specific electrical cir-
cuit with or without electro-mechanical components) which, along with
the process by which it operates, may be patented subject, of course, to the
requirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. Based on the pre-
sent law, we see no other reasonable conclusion.
1 16
111. See id. at 1406.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
115. This was confirmed by the CCPA in In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400
(C.C.P.A. 1969), wherein it was stated that:
if a machine is programmed in a certain new and unobvious way, it is physically
different from the machine without that program; its memory elements are differ-
ently arranged. The fact that these physical changes are invisible to the eye should
not tempt us to conclude that the machine has not been changed. If a new machine
has not been invented, certainly a "new and useful improvement" of the unpro-
grammed machine has been, and Congress has said in 35 U.S.C. 101 that such im-
provements are statutory subject matter for a patent. It may well be that the vast
majority of newly programmed machines are obvious to those skilled in the art and
hence unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 103. We are concluding here that such ma-
chines are statutory under 35 U.S.C. 101, and that claims defining them must be
judged for patentability in light of the prior art.
Id.
116. Prater 1l, 415 F.2d at 1403 n.29.
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Compounding the difficulty, the message as to the continuing vi-
tality of the mental steps doctrine was hopelessly mixed. On the one
hand, in Prater I the CCPA seemed to be signaling a willingness to re-
ject the mental steps doctrine altogether.1 7 On the other hand, Judge
Baldwin in Prater H explicitly reserved decision on this question,
while hinting that the doctrine might only remain vital as applied
through a section 112 indefiniteness inquiry." 8 At the same time,
Judge Baldwin appeared to affirm a distinction between "purely men-
tal steps" and "purely physical steps," thus permitting a reasonable
observer to conclude that this distinction remained significant, while
being desperately confused as to how it might be applied. 9
It is not surprising, therefore, that just over one year later, in the
case of In re Musgrave,120 the CCPA decisively eliminated the tor-
tured mental steps doctrine. The invention at issue in Musgrave re-
lated generally to a methodology for mapping the subsurface of the
earth by measuring vibrations (energy) generated from exploding dy-
namite beneath the earth's surface. 121 More specifically, the claims at
issue related to a process for correcting distortions in the electrical
signals generated from such vibrations, where the distortions were
caused by the linear spread of detectors along the earth's surface. 22
Relying solely on the mental steps doctrine, the examiner rejected the
process claims for lack of statutory subject matter, and the Board of
Appeals affirmed, arguing that, despite the fact that a physical repro-
duction (either magnetic or photographic) of the vibration signals was
117. See Prater 1, 415 F.2d at 1388-89.
118. See Prater II, 415 F.2d at 1403-05.
119. See id. at 1402 n.22. The court stated as follows:
"Purely mental steps" are considered to be steps which may only be performed in,
or with the aid of, the human mind. This is quite in contrast to "purely physical
steps" which may only be performed by physical means, machinery, or apparatus.
Purely mental steps (e.g., "believing") are quite different from purely physical
steps (e.g., "heating") in many respects, not the least of which is that the former
are much less susceptible to specific definition or delineation. Between the purely
mental and purely physical ends of the spectrum there lies an infinite variety of
steps that may be either machine-implemented or performed in, or with the aid of,
the human mind (e.g., "comparing" and "determining"). In ascertaining whether a
particular step is "mental" or "physical," each case must be decided on its own
facts, considering all of the surrounding circumstances, to determine which end of
the spectrum that step is nearer. It may well be that the step of "comparing" may
be "mental" in one process, yet "physical" in another. Disclosure of apparatus for
performing the process without human intervention may make out a prima facie
case that the disclosed process is not mental and is, therefore, statutory.
Id. (emphasis added).
120. In reMusgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
121. See id. at 882-84.
122. See id. at 882-85.
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necessary for the process to operate, the essential novelty of the inven-
tion lay in the correction method itself, which was drafted broadly
enough to include "mere mental processing."12 3 If the mere presence
of a physical apparatus was sufficient to take claims outside the men-
tal steps doctrine, the Board argued,
then methods of telling fortunes or predicting the activities of the stock
market would be patentable providing one included the use of playing
cards or a desk calculator in a claim that otherwise is for a non-statutory
algorithm, such as the hypothesized principles underlying human behavior
or the fluctuating values of the stock market.
12 4
In reversing the determination of the USPTO, Judge Rich, writing
for the majority, stated definitively that simply because a claimed
process delineates steps that could be taken in the human mind, the
claimed process is not therefore rendered non-statutory. 125 According
to Judge Rich, "[a]ll that is necessary . . . to make a sequence of op-
erational steps a statutory 'process' within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be
in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitu-
tional purpose to promote the progress of 'useful arts.' 126  In other
words, according to a majority of the CCPA, the scope of patentable
subject matter under the 1952 Patent Act is as broad as permitted by
the Constitution and is defined by the limits of what may be consid-
ered to constitute "technological arts." While the majority in Mus-
grave did not explicitly state its rejection of the mental steps doctrine,
such a rejection was logically clear from the position taken by the ma-
jority, as was noted by Judge Baldwin in his concurring opinion.127
123. See id. at 885-88. The Board also noted that certain of the claims represented a
"method of processing data," which it deemed non-statutory both based on the mental steps
doctrine and as a solution to a mathematical algorithm. See id at 888.
124. Id. at 886.
125. See id. at 892-93. Judge Rich also reiterated that the rules articulated by Abrams'
attorney in In re Abrams had not been adopted by the CCPA and, moreover, were rejected by
the CCPA. See id. at 888-90; supra note 95.
126. Id. at 893. Although the majority acknowledged the importance of a section 112
indefiniteness inquiry, it did not see that inquiry as determinative for the Musgrave claims.
See id.
Of course, to obtain a valid patent the claim must also comply with all the other
provisions of the statute, including definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112. A step re-
quiring the exercise of subjective judgment without restriction might be objection-
able as rendering a claim indefinite, but this would provide no statutory basis for a
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Moreover ... the claims here on appeal clearly
contain no steps of that type.
Id.
127. See id. at 894 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
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By taking the position that statutory subject matter extended to the
full range of the technological arts, it may be inferred that the Mus-
grave majority believed it had solved the vexing problems of deter-
mining whether process claims encompassed mental steps, in addition
to disabusing the USPTO of the notion that it could utilize a "point of
novelty approach,"'' 28 separately analyzing the individual steps of a
particular claim and rejecting the claim on the basis that its only novel
steps were mental. 29 In reality, as Judge Baldwin noted in his concur-
ring opinion, the Musgrave majority had substituted new definitional
problems, including the problem of divining the meaning of techno-
logical arts, for the familiar definitional problems relating to mental
steps. 130
C. Replacing "Mental Steps" with "Algorithms"-The Supreme
Court Steps in (1972-1981)
In Gottschalk v. Benson,'3' the Supreme Court recognized the op-
portunity to opine directly on the patentability of computer software
and seized it. The invention at issue in Benson was a computer pro-
gram for converting decimal numerals (numbers 0 and 1-9, ordered to
reflect conventional numbers, for example, 192) into "computer-
readable" binary numerals, combinations of 0 and 1.132 The program
was claimed as a process, operating in a general-purpose computer,
and the claims were not otherwise limited to a particular applica-
tion.'33 The USPTO, apparently clinging to its 1968 Guidelines and
the familiar mental steps doctrine, rejected the claims as lacking pat-
entable subject matter."'4 The CCPA reversed, noting that it had dealt
"at length" with the mental steps doctrine in the Prater and Musgrave
128. Using the point of novelty approach, an examiner identified the particular aspects
of a claim that were novel and, if the only novel aspects comprised non-statutory items (for
example, mental steps), rejected the entire claim as "nonstatutory" under § 101. Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 201 n.15 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. See Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893.
In considering the patentability of a process consisting of a plurality of steps we
think it is immaterial to the question whether the combination is a statutory 'proc-
ess' that individual steps are old. The whole process could be old and yet be statu-
tory; a fortiori, it matters not that one or more steps are old.
Id.
130. See id. at 893, 895.
131. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
132. See id. at 63-67.
133. Id. at 64.
134. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 684-86 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Benson,
409 U.S. at 63.
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decisions, but relying primarily on the fact that the processes disclosed
were clearly contemplated to be carried out by a machine and there-
fore did not necessarily implicate steps carried out by a human
mind.135 Alluding once again to the scope of statutory subject matter
as equated with useful arts, meaning technological arts, the CCPA
took the opportunity to state as follows:
It seems beyond question that the machines-the computers-are in the
technological field, are a part of one of our best-known technologies, and
are in the "useful arts" rather than the "liberal arts," as are all other types
of "business machines," regardless of the uses to which their users may
put them. How can it be said that a process having no practical value
other than enhancing the internal operation of those machines is not like-
wise in the technological or useful arts?
13 6
Returning to a familiar theme, the Supreme Court reversed, stat-
ing that "the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not
include particular machines" is the "[transformation and reduction of
an article 'to a different state or thing."" 37 Citing Tilghman v. Proc-
tor, 1 38 the Court thus revived the basic reliance on physical transfor-
mation as the hallmark of patentable subject matter,'39 in direct con-
trast to Judge Smith in Prater I who had relied on that same case in
rejecting the notion that the patentability of process claims hinged on
whether such processes "operate physically upon substances.""' 4 De-
nying that the Court was wholly precluding patentability of computer
programs or "leaving no room for the revelations of the new, onrush-
ing technology," Justice Douglas (writing for a unanimous Supreme
Court) argued that permitting a patent on the claims in Benson would
be equivalent to patenting an idea. 14  The Court expressed concern
with the potential scope of such a patent, stating that because the
"mathematical formula" at issue in the application had "no substantial
practical application" other than in a computer, a "patent would
wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself."' 142 The Court noted the rec-
135. See id. at 686-88.
136. Id. at 688.
137. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70.
138. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
139. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 70; supra notes 49, 61-63.
140. Prater 1, 415 F.2d at 1387-89.
141. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
142. See id. at 71-72.
2005]
23
Ford: Alchemy and Patentability: Technology, "Useful Arts," and the Chi
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
ommendation of the 1965 President's Commission and called on Con-
gress to address these technological problems as a policy matter. 143
Following Benson, the USPTO essentially replaced mental step
with algorithms in rejecting claims implicating computer programs,
and the CCPA reacted by systematically limiting the scope of exclu-
sion. First, the CCPA determined that Benson only applied to process
claims." Thus, in accordance with holdings prior to Benson, ' 45 where
a computer program was claimed as a machine specially programmed
to carry out a non-obvious purpose, it would be patentable as "struc-
turally different from a machine without that program."' 146 Second, the
CCPA interpreted Benson narrowly as it applied to process claims,
finding those claims to fail for lack of statutory subject matter only
where allowing their patentability "would pre-empt all uses of an al-
gorithm or mathematical formula."' 47
However, the USPTO strenuously objected to the direction taken
by the CCPA, and in 1978, the Supreme Court attempted once again
to intervene. 148 The invention at issue in Parker v. Flook generally re-
lated to the calculation by a computer of an "alarm limit" to signal ab-
normal conditions in the process of catalytic conversion. 1'4 9 More spe-
cifically, the applicants claimed a process to make use of a
mathematical formula in order to continuously update the alarm limit
based on changing conditions throughout the catalytic conversion
process. 150 Noting that the industrial applications of this process were
widely dispersed, the Supreme Court nevertheless found that the
claims "do not . . . cover every conceivable application of the for-
mula."'' Thus, in reversing the determination of the CCPA 5 and
holding that the applicant's claims failed as lacking statutory subject
143. See id. at 72-73.
144. See In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 149 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765,
771 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
145. See, e.g., In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
146. In re Noll, 545 F.2d at 148.
147. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 203 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see In re
Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 156, 158-59 (1976). In order to identify this narrow class of mathe-
matical formulae and algorithms, In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (1978), articulated a two-part
test, under which a determination was first to be made whether an "algorithm" was recited or
implicated by the process claims. Id. at 1245. If so, the claim was to be "further analyzed to
ascertain whether in its entirety it wholly preempts that algorithm." Id.
148. See Parker v. Hook, 437 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1978) (describing the certiorari petition
of the Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks).
149. See id. at 585.
150. See id. at 585-86.
151. Id.at586.
152. Id. at 596.
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matter under section 101,153 the Supreme Court clearly signaled its
disapproval of the CCPA's narrow interpretation of Benson.
Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the cal-
culation resulted in a specific usable outcome (alarm limit), and thus
implicated "post-solution" physical activity, was not sufficient to
make the claims statutory under section 101 in light of Benson.154
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens reiterated the need to distin-
guish patentable processes from unpatentable principles 55 and, citing
Cochrane v. Deener, 5 6 hinted that the Court might only recognize
statutory processes where the particular process "either was tied to a
particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a 'different
state or thing."" 57  Thus, the Supreme Court appeared to return to
physical transformation as the key to delimiting the scope of pat-
entable processes.
Unfortunately, the Court did not limit its holding to these points,
but proceeded further to articulate a test to determine a process "new
and useful" and therefore statutory under section 101.158 In making
this determination, the Court directed that a mathematical algorithm
recited in the claims should be "treated as though it were a familiar
part of the prior art." '59 Using this analytical tool, the Court deter-
mined that the claims at issue in Parker did not recite statutory subject
matter because only the calculation method was new and useful. 160
This mode of argument left the Court vulnerable to two significant
criticisms; these were, first, that it was improperly confusing the ques-
tion of statutory subject matter with the questions of novelty and non-
obviousness and, second, that it was separately analyzing the various
153. Id. at 589-90, 594.
154. Id. at 589-90.
The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in it-
self, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form
over substance. A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution
activity to almost any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not
have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application con-
tained a final step indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully ap-
plied to existing surveying techniques.
Id. at 590.
155. Id. at 589. "The line between a patentable 'process' and an unpatentable 'princi-
ple' is not always clear. Both are 'conception[s] of the mind, seen only by [their] effects
when being executed or performed."' Id. (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728
(1880)).
156. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
157. See Parker, 437 U.S. at 588 n.9.
158. See id. at 591-92.
159. Id. at 592.
160. Id. at 594-95.
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elements of a claim, utilizing the same point-of-novelty analysis as
had the USPTO in applying the mental steps doctrine. 161
The holding in Parker did very little to resolve the disagreement
between the CCPA and the USPTO.'6 2 The CCPA was highly critical
of the Parker opinion 63 and, other than adding a slight modification to
its two-part test for determining whether a process claim was non-
statutory for including a mathematical algorithm,"6 continued to treat
process claims as statutory even where the only new element was im-
plemented through a computer program. 165  At the same time, the
USPTO continued to treat the exclusion for algorithms as functionally
equivalent to the exclusion for mental steps, rejecting computer pro-
grams as unpatentable under section 101 of the Patent Act and pursu-
ant to the 1968 Guidelines. 166
The Supreme Court returned to the troublesome issue of software
patents one last time in 1981, in the case of Diamond v. Diehr.167 The
invention at issue in Diehr generally involved a process for "curing"
synthetic rubber into a usable product by applying heat to a mixture of
rubber chemical components and curing agents inside a mold.168 More
specifically, the applicants' claims related to a process whereby the
temperature inside the mold was continuously measured and fed into a
computer, which updated the cure time, based on application of a fa-
miliar mathematical formula, and opened the mold at the moment in-
dicated by the calculation. 69 The examiner rejected the claims based
on the Supreme Court's decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, arguing that
they clearly contemplated the use of a computer program and inter-
preting Benson as standing for the proposition that such claims were
unpatentable in the absence of Congressional action to resolve the
question of computer program patentability. 7 0 The Board of Appeals
161. Both these points were raised in the dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart, which
was joined by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger. See id. at 599-600 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissent in Diamond v. Diehr explicitly acknowledged that "this
analysis is functionally the same as the point-of-novelty analysis used in conjunction with the
mental-steps doctrine." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 204 n.22 (1981) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
162. See Soma et al., supra note 7, at 14.
163. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 964-67 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
164. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 766-67 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
165. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 204-05.
166. See Soma et al., supra note 7, at 14.
167. Diehr, 450 US. 175.
168. See id. at 177 & n. 1.
169. See id. at 178-79.
170. See In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 984 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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affirmed based on a determination that the heart of the invention was
an "algorithm solving a mathematical problem in the sense" of Parker
v. Flook; according to the Board, the only points of novelty in the in-
vention lay in the steps of the claim relating to the application of the
mathematical algorithm.' Noting, based on Parker, that the mere
presence of post-solution physical activity is not sufficient to render
statutory a claim relating to a mathematical algorithm, the Board de-
cided that the invention was essentially a computer program and that
under the Supreme Court's holdings in Benson and Parker, the inven-
tion did not constitute statutory subject matter.172
The CCPA reversed, finding fault with the examiner's reasoning
that all computer programs were non-statutory subject matter and with
the Board of Appeals' use of the point of novelty approach.173 Look-
ing at the claimed process as a whole, the CCPA characterized it as
"fundamentally different from" the process at issue in Parker, where
the applicant was "claiming a process for merely generating a new
number by calculation. ' 174 According to the CCPA, because the cal-
culations at issue in Diehr were "intimately entwined" with a physical
process, the claims viewed as a whole were directed to statutory sub-
ject matter under Benson and Parker. 175
For the first time, the Supreme Court affirmed the determination
of the CCPA based on nearly identical reasoning. 176 Returning to the
early cases interpreting art to mean process under the Patent Act of
1793177 and reciting the mantra that "Congress intended statutory sub-
ject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by
man,"" 78 the Court held that "a physical and chemical process for
molding precision synthetic rubber products falls within the section
101 categories of possibly patentable subject-matter.' 1 79  Tracing
through its prior cases distinguishing statutory subject matter from
non-statutory "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,"
the Court stated that "a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statu-
tory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathe-
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 985-89.
174. Id. at 988-89.
175. See id.
176. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1981).
177. See id. at 182-84; supra notes 41-51, 58-62 and accompanying text.
178. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182.
179. Id. at 184.
20051
27
Ford: Alchemy and Patentability: Technology, "Useful Arts," and the Chi
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
matical formula, computer program, or digital computer."'' 80 Relying
yet again on physical transformation to distinguish patentable claims
from those seeking to patent an idea or principle, the Court held that
when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies
that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole,
is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect
(e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then
the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.181
Characterizing the applicants' claims as being drawn to such a pat-
entable "industrial process" (molding rubber products), the Court af-
firmed the judgment of the CCPA.82
Moreover, the Court took the opportunity to firnmly reject the point
of novelty approach, stating that a determination of whether a process
claim states statutory subject matter must proceed based on an evalua-
tion of the process as a whole and should not involve considerations of
novelty or non-obviousness.'83 Refusing to acknowledge that it was
overruling Parker in this regard, the Court simply stated that to accept
the point of novelty approach "would, if carried to its extreme, make
all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to
underlying principles of nature which, once known, make their im-
plementation obvious."""
By focusing on the "transformation or reduction of an article to a
different state or thing" as the hallmark of the useful arts and eliminat-
ing point of novelty analysis, the Court synchronized its approach
with that of the CCPA, as articulated in Musgrave over ten years pre-
viously. 85 Although this signaled a welcome consistency between the
Supreme Court and the CCPA, it pointed the way to the very same
constitutional questions that Judge Baldwin had noted in his concur-
180. Id. at 187.
181. Id. at 192.
182. See id. at 192-93.
183. See id. at 188-90.
It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ig-
nore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a
process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable
even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in com-
mon use before the combination was made. The 'novelty' of any element or steps
in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly
patentable subject matter.
Id. at 188-89.
184. See id. at 189 n.12.
185. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
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ring opinion in Musgrave. 8 6 The nature of technology remained inde-
terminate.
D. Eliminating the Connection to "Physical Transformation"
(1982-Present)
In 1982, the Federal Circuit replaced the CCPA.187 Recognizing
the Supreme Court's validation of the CCPA's general approach in
Diehr, the Federal Circuit continued to rely on the CCPA's pre-Diehr
doctrines for identifying non-patentable algorithms, albeit refined
somewhat as a result of Diehr.188 In effect, this meant that a computer
program cleared the section 101 hurdle where it could be character-
ized as effecting a physical transformation of some kind, whether
claimed as an apparatus 89 or as a process.1 90  However, problems
arose where a computer program or software was claimed directly be-
cause, under this approach, apparatus claims might succeed by virtue
of their connection to physical elements of the computer,191 while
186. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
188. The two-part test recited in In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
and In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 766-67 (C.C.P.A. 1980) was modified by In re Abele, 684
F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982). See Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958
F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992); supra notes 147, 164 and accompanying text. The resultant
Freeman-Walter-Abele test was applied by first determining:
whether a mathematical algorithm is recited directly or indirectly in the claim. If
so, it is next determined whether the claimed invention as a whole is no more than
the algorithm itself; that is, whether the claim is directed to a mathematical algo-
rithm that is not applied to or limited by physical elements or process steps. Such
claims are nonstatutory. However, when the mathematical algorithm is applied in
one or more steps of an otherwise statutory process claim, or one or more elements
of an otherwise statutory apparatus claim, the requirements of § 101 are met.
Arrhythmia Research Tech., 958 F.2d at 1058.
189. See Arrhythmia Research Tech., 958 F.2d at 1060-61 ("The computer-performed
operations transform a particular input signal to a different output signal, in accordance with
the internal structure of the computer as configured by electronic instructions. 'The claimed
invention ... converts one physical thing into another physical thing just as any other electri-
cal circuitry would do."' (quoting In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 819 (C.C.P.A. 1980)) (al-
teration in original)).
190. See id. at 1059 (characterizing the process steps as "physical process steps that
transform one physical, electrical signal into another" and the Freeman- Walter-Abele stan-
dard as met because "the steps of [applicant's] method comprise an otherwise statutory proc-
ess whose mathematical procedures are applied to physical process steps").
191. See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Because the apparatus claim
was drafted in means-plus-function form, the Federal Circuit held that the procedural ele-
ments of the claim should be interpreted as limited by the physical structures recited in the
specification, pursuant to section 112, paragraph 6 of the 1952 Patent Act. See id. at 1375.
Under this holding, as long as the specification recited physical structures, the means-plus-
function claim form operated to establish patentability. Soma et al., supra note 7, at 19.
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process claims might fail due to their characterization as a mathemati-
cal algorithm. 192
In 1994, the Federal Circuit initiated the move away from physi-
cality as the key to patentability through its decision in In re Alap-
pat.193 The invention at issue in Alappat concerned a mechanism for
producing smooth waveform displays on a screen similar to a televi-
sion screen. 194 More specifically, the applicants claimed an apparatus
(a rasterizer), described in means-plus-function form, which adjusted
the illumination intensity of pixels on the screen in order to accurately
represent the vector (linear direction) of the wave. 195 In reversing the
patent rejection by the USPTO, 19 6 the Federal Circuit followed its
prior precedents, finding patentability based on the connection of
claimed means with supporting structures recited in the specifica-
tion. 197 Significantly, however, the Federal Circuit did not emphasize
the physical aspect of these structures, but rather focused on a deter-
mination that the claimed invention, when viewed as a whole, was not
a "disembodied mathematical concept."' 98 Finding that "the claimed
invention as a whole is directed to a combination of interrelated ele-
ments which combine to form a machine for converting discrete wave-
form data samples into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to
be displayed on a display means,"' 99 the Federal Circuit held that
"[t]his is not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be char-
acterized as an 'abstract idea,' but rather a specific machine to pro-
duce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.'2"° Moreover, the Federal
Circuit reiterated that a general-purpose computer programmed to
192. See id. at 18-19.
193. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
194. See id. at 1537.
195. See id. at 1537-38.
196. Id. at 1545.
197. Id. at 1540-41.
198. Id. at 1544. Having reviewed the precedent relating to mathematical algorithms,
the Federal Circuit concluded that
the proper inquiry in dealing with the so called mathematical subject matter excep-
tion to § 101 alleged herein is to see whether the claimed subject matter as a whole
is a disembodied mathematical concept, whether categorized as a mathematical
formula, mathematical equation, mathematical algorithm, or the like, which in es-
sence represents nothing more than a "law of nature," "natural phenomenon," or
"abstract idea."
Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. (emphasis added).
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carry out such a result "in effect becomes a special purpose [machine]
once it is programmed."'
Although the Alappat case was delivered by a fractured en banc
panel of the Federal Circuit, it constituted an essential step away from
physical transformation as the key to patentability under section 101
to "useful, concrete, and tangible" as the key to such patentability.
The following year, the USPTO published new proposed guidelines
relating to the treatment of "Computer-Implemented Inventions,
20 2
which were finalized in 1996203 and incorporated in the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP)2°4 as section 2106 in 1998.205
Under these Guidelines, computer-implemented inventions were gen-
erally treated as patentable subject matter as long as they had a "prac-
tical application": "[o]nly when the claim is devoid of any limitation
to a practical application in the technological arts should it be rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. "206 The examiner bore the burden to demon-
strate that there was no conceivable practical application in the tech-
nological arts.207
That same year, the Federal Circuit decided State Street Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group. °8 Viewed in light of the
above-described historical developments, the State Street decision
comprised merely the next logical step, but it is enormously signifi-
cant in expressly eliminating physicality as a defining aspect of tech-
nology. The invention at issue in State Street was generally described
as a "data processing system" relating to a particular investment struc-
ture of mutual funds, identified under the trademark Hub and Spoke®,
whereby spoke funds would "pool their assets in [the hub] investment
201. Id. at 1545.
202. Request for Comments on Proposed Examination Guidelines for Computer-
Implemented Inventions, 60 Fed. Reg. 28,778 (June 2, 1995).
203. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7,478
(Feb. 28, 1996).
204. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (7th ed. 1998), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/indexold.htm [hereinafter PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 7th ed.].
205. See Soma et al., supra note 7, at 23-24.
206. PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 7th ed, supra note 204, § 2106(I)(A), at 2100-5 to
-6.
207. See id.; cf PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106(IV) (8th ed. 2001), available at http://www.
uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm [hereinafter PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 8th
ed.].
208. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
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portfolio. ' '209 The overall structure was organized as a partnership for
tax purposes and provided the added benefit of "economies of scale"
in administration costs, due to the fact that changes in value for ac-
counting and tax purposes could be calculated solely from the per-
spective of the investment hub and then attributed to each spoke based
on the share of investment in the hub's assets. 210 As noted by the Fed-
eral Circuit, "the complexity of the calculations" involved meant that
"a computer or equivalent device is a virtual necessity to perform the
task."211
State Street reached the Federal Circuit as an appeal from a grant
of partial summary judgment by the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts, which had granted the motion in favor of State
Street Bank & Trust Co. (State Street), finding as a matter of law that
Signature Financial Group's (Signature's) patent on the Hub and
Spoke® "data processing system" was invalid under section 101 of the
Patent Act.212 Apparently, Signature entered into licensing negotia-
tions with State Street, but these negotiations broke down. 213 The ap-
plication originally contained both process and apparatus claims, but
the process claims were withdrawn prior to the appeal to the Federal
Circuit.21 4 The district court determined the apparatus claims, drafted
in means-plus-function form, to be invalid under section 101 because
it concluded that they fell within the mathematical algorithm and
"business method" exceptions to statutory subject matter.2"5
The Federal Circuit responded by summarily laying the "ill-
conceived [business method] exception to rest" 216 and determining that
so long as a mathematical algorithm is "applied in a 'useful' way," it
constitutes patentable subject matter under section 101.217 In rejecting
the business method exception to statutory subject matter, the Federal
Circuit essentially took the position that the technology by which
modern business is carried out cannot be separated from the business
methodologies that make use of that technology and that, therefore,
209. Id. at 1370.
210. Id. at 1370-71.
211. Id. at 1371.
212. Id. at 1370; State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp.
502, 502 (D. Mass. 1996).
213. State St. Bank & Trust, 149 F.3d at 1370.
214. Id. at 1371.
215. See id. at 1372.
216. Id. at 1375.
217. See id. at 1373-75.
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the latter is patentable to the same degree as the former.21 8 Citing In
re Alappat's holding that a mathematical algorithm is patentable under
section 101 so long as it produces a "useful, concrete and tangible" re-
sult, 2 19 the Federal Circuit proceeded to effectively eliminate the "tan-
gible" aspect of that test, stating that "[u]npatentable mathematical al-
gorithms are identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas
constituting disembodied concepts or truths that are not 'useful.' 221
The result, "a final share price momentarily fixed for recording and
reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory
authorities and in subsequent trades," produced by the apparatus, a
data processing system claimed in means-plus-function form, was use-
ful; the fact that such result was a number rather than a physical thing
did not interfere with its patentability under section 101 of the 1952
Patent Act.22'
This logic was extended one year later in AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications.222 The invention claimed by AT&T Corp. in this
case concerned a system by which a long-distance telephone service
subscriber could be identified by the service to which he/she had sub-
scribed, enabling differential billing based on whether the subscriber
was calling someone who subscribed to the same or a different ser-
vice. 223 This system operated by virtue of a "PIC" indicator (identify-
ing the service provider of a particular subscriber and the person
he/she was calling), and the process claimed merely connected sub-
scribers' PICs through application of Boolean algebra.224 However,
"[b]ecause the ... process applies the Boolean principle to produce a
useful, concrete, tangible result without pre-empting other uses of the
mathematical principle," the Federal Circuit found no barrier to pat-
entability under section 10 1.225
Most significantly, the Federal Circuit explicitly rejected the no-
tion that a physical transformation is required for patentability under
section 101, stating that a physical transformation "is not an invariable
218. See id. at 1376 n.13 ("Any historical distinctions between a method of 'doing'
business and the means of carrying it out blur in the complexity of modem business sys-
tems."). The court's legal argument proceeded on the basis that the business method excep-
tion had never been solidly established and that each of the decisions that recited it actually
relied on a different basis in finding a claimed invention unpatentable. See id. at 1375-76.
219. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
220. See State St. Bank & Trust, 149 F.3d at 1373.
221. Id. at 1373, 1375.
222. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
223. Id. at 1353-54.
224. Id. at 1353-54, 1358.
225. Id. at 1358.
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requirement, but merely one example of how a mathematical algo-
rithm may bring about a useful application" and finding a "physical
limitations analysis.., of little value. ' 226 Thus the Federal Circuit de-
termined that its Freeman-Walter-Abele test,227 which was applied fol-
lowing Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v. Flook to determine
whether the mathematical algorithm exception prohibited patentability
under section 101,228 was no longer relevant. 229 According to the Fed-
eral Circuit, in cases where the presence of a mathematical algorithm
brings statutory subject matter into question, the only relevant inquir-
ies are whether a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter" 230 has been described in the claims pursuant to section 101 of
the Patent Act and whether such "process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter" produces a result which is useful.231
As America entered the twenty-first century, it thus became clear
that a connection to the physical world was no longer necessary in or-
der to demonstrate patentability under section 101 of the 1952 Patent
Act. In many ways, the Federal Circuit had merely returned to Judge
Smith's holding in Prater I, which explicitly contemplated severance
of patentability from physicality. 2 2 However, when viewed adjacent
to early and established Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Cir-
cuit's patentability jurisprudence leaves something to be desired; it is
difficult to identify any real attempt to wrestle either with the nature of
technology or with what may divide such technology, or useful arts,
from cultural and social arts. Even more concerning is the absence of
any acknowledgement that good reasons may exist to exclude cultural
and social arts, as well as principles, from patentable subject matter.233
Unquestionably, the American attempt to wrestle with patentability
questions pertaining to computer programs has produced a meta-
226. Id. at 1358-59.
227. See supra note 188 for a discussion of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.
228. See supra note 188.
229. See AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1359-60.
230. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
231. See AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1359-60.
232. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
233. Given the enormous utility of calculus, one might be tempted to conclude that un-
der the Federal Circuit's State Street Bank & Trust and AT&T holdings, it would be pat-
entable. Although it is impossible to know what the impact upon subsequent intellectual de-
velopments would have been had Sir Isaac Newton or Gottfried Leibniz been able to patent
calculus, it is sobering to consider the possibility. The question of whether calculus could
have been protected under a patent system, and the impact that this may have had, was re-
cently raised by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve System, at a
conference held in Georgia. See Greenspan Mulls Patent Problems, BBC NEWS, Apr. 4,
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2918691.stm.
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jurisprudence of patentability. If one were to characterize that meta-
jurisprudence as it appears today, the characterization may be as fol-
lows: anything may be patented, regardless of the field or human en-
deavor to which it may relate, so long as it is useful,234 new, 235 non-
obvious, 236 and adequately disclosed. 23 7 In attempting to free itself
from potentially-outdated definitions of technology, the Federal Cir-
cuit may have, in effect, defined technology to encompass the entire
range of human activity.
IV. THE EUROPEAN STRUGGLE
The European struggle to determine whether computer programs
should be patentable is better comprehended with an appreciation of
the varying patent law frameworks that existed in Europe prior to the
1960s and the degree to which these frameworks were undermined by
the rapid pace of legal and economic integration that occurred be-
tween 1960 and 1973. As has been shown, the question of computer
program patentability posed enormous challenges in America, which
enjoyed the benefits of a relatively stable patent law framework
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the case of
Europe, the challenge of computer programs arose during a period of
significant legal instability and thus was even more acute. However,
as will be seen, Europe also enjoyed the benefits of later-developed
patent systems, particularly the German system, which emphasized
technical character as a prerequisite to patentability. Although techni-
cal character has proven difficult to define, it has permitted European
judges to articulate limits to patentability without necessarily relying
on physicality to define those limits.
A. Patentability Across Europe Prior to 1960
Prior to the 1960s, the nation-states of Europe maintained rela-
tively distinct legal frameworks for the granting of patents, which re-
flected varying historical experiences and philosophies relating to "in-
dustrial property. 238  In the United Kingdom, the patent law
234. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
235. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
236. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
237. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). These are the basic requirements for patentability, in ad-
dition to the requirement of patentable subject matter. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 112 (3d ed. 2003).
238. Thomas M. Meshbesher, The Role of History in Comparative Patent Law, 78 J.
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framework was determined by the constitutional history of that nation,
particularly the titanic battle over royally-granted monopolies, as
evinced by the remaining foundational relevance of the Statute of Mo-
nopolies of 1623.239 This connection to a statute of such age resulted
in the necessity of continually harmonizing legal development with
older principles and on the whole tended to make English patent law
relatively conservative and resistant to change. 24° France, on the other
hand, did not hesitate to break with the past as it emerged out of the
Revolution and articulated a law of industrial property founded on the
Rights of Man.241 Nevertheless, the patent law framework developed
in 1790 constituted a basic pattern for French patent law that survived
until the late 1960s.242 In the case of Germany, the emergence of a
patent law rooted in the nation-state had to await the emergence of
that nation-state; neither would occur until the nineteenth century.243
Partly because it developed relatively late, the patent law of the Ger-
man nation contained certain features that distinguished it from the
older patent laws of its neighbors. 244
As additional European nation-states developed, they tended to
imitate one of the three established patterns: English, French or Ger-
man, to varying degrees. Thus, Italy, which led the European devel-
opment of patent law during the fifteenth century, but did not form a
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 594 (1996); David L. Cohen, Comment, Article 69 and
European Patent Integration, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1082, 1092-1112 (1998).
239. See PETER MEINHARDT, INVENTIONS PATENTS AND MONOPOLY 30-32 (1946). Sec-
tion 6 of the Statute of Monopolies of 1623 provided an exception to the general prohibition
against monopolies for "letters patent and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years or
under . . . of the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures within this
Realm, to the true and first inventor of such manufactures." Id. at 31 (quoting Statute of Mo-
nopolies § 6 (1623) (UK)). Through the Patents Act of 1949, the patent law of the United
Kingdom continued to reference section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies in defining what con-
stituted a patentable invention. See Patents Act of 1949, 1949, c. 87, § 101(1) (Eng.)
("'[I]nvention' means any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant
of privilege within section six of the Statute of Monopolies and any new method or process of
testing applicable to the improvement or control of manufacture, and includes an alleged in-
vention.").
240. See Meshbesher, supra note 238, at 601-02.
241. See Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property From 1545 to 1787, 26 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 711, 756-57 (1944) (quoting the Industrial Property Statute of 1790 (Fr.)).
242. See Z. Weinstein, Changes in Patent and Trademark Laws in France in the Last
Ten Years, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 778, 778-88 (1971).
243. See Cohen, supra note 238, at 1103-04. The German history of granting exclusive
privileges to inventors is much older than the modem German state. See Frank D. Prager, The
Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 106, 122-26
(1952).
244. See Cohen, supra note 238, at 1103-11; Friedrich-Karl Beier, Future Problems of
Patent Law, 3 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 423, 424-28 (1972). The first Ger-
man patent statute was enacted in 1877. See id. at 424-25.
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unified nation-state until the nineteenth century, followed the French
pattern of patent law established in 1790 and perpetuated through the
law of 1844.245 Similarly, the Belgian patent law of 1854 was strongly
influenced by the French law of 1844.24 On the other hand, the Scan-
dinavian and Nordic countries, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and
Finland, as well as the Netherlands, followed the German approach.2 47
Switzerland did not develop anything beyond a very limited patent
law until the early twentieth century,2 48 but the Swiss patent law that
eventually developed seems to have been heavily influenced by the
German approach, at least as far as patentability was concerned.249
The substantive feature common to all European patent laws, prior
to the 1960s, was an emphasis on novelty and invention; the norma-
tive framework, as evinced in the various laws, was that patents
should only be granted for new inventions.250 Application of this
framework over the course of time, in the context of differing national
histories and philosophical approaches to the law of patents, led to
245. See Mario Franzosi, Italy, in EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 33, 34 (Prac-
tising Law Institute 1971). The Italian patent law prior to the 1960s was based on an 1854
law, enacted just prior to Italian unification and "derived from French experiences." See id.
In 1474, the Republic of Venice enacted the first known general statute enabling the granting
of exclusive rights for any "new and ingenious device" reduced to perfection in the City. See
BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 22-23 (1967).
246. See Florent Gevers, Belgium, in EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note
245, at 27.
247. See Christer Onn, Scandinavia, in EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra
note 245, at 85-92; George F. van der Beek, The Netherlands, in EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 245, at 61-63 (describing the Patents Act of 1910, created anew after a
hiatus in granting patents that began in 1869 due to strong Dutch opposition to patents gener-
ally); Host-Madsen, Danish Patent System, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 160 (1948) (describing the
Danish Patents Act of 1894, which was the first in Denmark, and its replacement by the Pat-
ents Act of 1936).
248. See Dominique S. Ritter, Switzerland's Patent Law History, 14 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 463 (2004).
249. See Amt fur Geistiges Eigentum [Swiss Office for the Protection of Intellectual
Property] Sept. 3, 1968, 3055/67 (Switz.), reprinted in English in 1 INT'L REV. OF INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 148 (describing art. 1 par. 1 of the Patent Act as allowing patents for
an "invention having industrial application").
250. See Patentgesetz [German Patent Act], May 9, 1961, I at § 1(2)-(3), reprinted and
translated in DR. J-DETLEV FRHR. VON UEXKCLL, GERMAN PATENT LAW, UTILITY MODEL
LAW AND TRADE MARK LAW 9 (1963) ("Patents are granted in respect of new inventions
which are susceptible of industrial use."); Patents Act of 1949, 1949, c. 87 § 101(1) (Eng.)
(patents only granted for "inventions," which are defined to be "any manner of new manufac-
ture" within the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies); Prager, supra note 241,
at756-57 (quoting the Industrial Property Statute of 1790 (Fr.) ("Any discovery or new inven-
tion, in any kind of industry, is the property of its author.")). Even the nations that embraced
socialism in the twentieth century required a new invention in order to grant a patent or simi-
lar inducement. See A. Vida, The Law of Industrial Property in the Peoples' Democracies
and the Soviet Union, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 898 (1963).
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significant differences in the additional elements articulated as requi-
sites to patentability.
In the United Kingdom, the extension of patentability to processes
and methods, in addition to "articles," meant that the historically
rooted definition of invention as a "manner of new manufacture" had
to be re-interpreted.2 1' This led to a determination that in order to be
patentable, an invention, particularly one claimed in the form of a
method or process, must result in the production of some "vendible
product. 25 2 Additionally, in order to be upheld as valid, an invention
had to possess utility. 253 The word utility captured two distinct con-
cepts: first, an invention had to work the way it was supposed to, and
second, the invention had to produce some "useful result," meaning
something that in some small way was "better, cheaper, quicker," or
more efficient than what had come before.254 Finally, a patent was
upheld as valid only if the claimed invention involved an "inventive
step" and was not "obvious." 5 The requisite inventive step tended to
be defined negatively; mere analogous uses of known devices or proc-
esses, combinations of known parts or devices absent "ingenuity" or a
"striking result," and mere application of "common knowledge" or
"public general knowledge," did not constitute inventive steps suffi-
cient to support the validity of a granted patent. 6
On the Continent, the tendency was to struggle directly with the
nature of invention, rather than to elaborate additional, and nominally
separate, requirements for patentability. In Germany, courts inter-
251. See THOMAS TERRELL, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO LETTERS PATENT FOR
INVENTIONS 24 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1884).
[T]he more modem view of the construction of the words "new manufacture" has
been the result of a great deal of development. At first the judges seemed to be in-
clined to limit the subject-matter of letters patent to new articles produced; but as
the arts and manufactures of the country progressed and increased, it was seen that
by far the most important inventions were inventions in the process of making old
and well-known articles of commerce, and so it became evident that should the
construction of the words "new manufactures" be entirely limited to the production
of new articles, to the exclusion of the process of manufacturing old articles by
cheaper, better and more improved methods, the inducement which the common
law intended to give to inventors would be curtailed to the narrowest possible lim-
its.
Id.
252. See In re Slee and Harris, (1966) R.P.C. 194, 196 (Pat. Ct.) (Eng.) (discussing the
holding in In re G.E.C., (1943), 60 R.P.C. I (Pat. Ct.) (Eng.), that a method is a manufacture
if it "results in the production of some vendible product"); MEINHARDT, supra note 239, at 41,
43-45.
253. See MEINHARDT, supra note 239, at 41, 47-48.
254. See id. at 47-48.
255. See id. at 41, 45-47.
256. See id.
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preted the concept of patentable invention to require a technical effect
(technischer Effekt) bringing an "advance in art. '257 The "old German
view" was that such a new technical effect was the characteristic that
distinguished an invention from mere improvements.25 s Over time,
the absolute requirement of a new technical effect softened slightly, at
least in the view of some commentators, to the requirement of a con-
siderable technical advance, which contained the seeds of a focus on
the degree of invention: "inventive level" or "inventive height" (Er-
findungshoehe).259  However, the old standard did not disappear, but
retained a presence in German patent law as the requirement of "tech-
nical progress/advance" (technischer Fortschritt), coexisting with the
requirement of inventive height.2 °
Although the German Patent Act maintained the additional re-
quirement that a patentable invention must be "susceptible of indus-
trial use,"'261 this requirement tended to be absorbed under the re-
quirement that an invention have a technical character, such that the
emphasis in demonstrating patentability would almost always center
on proof of technical advance or technical effect. 262 This requirement
remained substantially the same whether one claimed a process or a
product.2 63 The German emphasis on technical character or technical
257. See Cohen, supra note 238, at 1108 (describing an 1889 decision of the
Reichsgericht, which is also discussed in Friedrich-Karl Beier, The Inventive Step in Its His-
torical Development, 17 INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 301, 319 (1986)); Wolf-
gang G. Fasse, Basic Patentability Requirements in the United States and Germany, 44 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 27, 28, 32-34 (1962); Paul B. West, The German Analogy Process Doctrine,
42 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 621, 622-23 (1960). The memoirs of Carl Duisberg, a well-known
German chemist of the nineteenth century, indicate that technical effect was a requirement for
patentability under German law as early as 1885. See Peter J. Gaylor & L.F. Marx, Carl Du-
isberg on Patents, 26 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 344, 349 (1944). "In order to prove a technical ef-
fect, which at that time [1885] already was important and influential for the decision on the
patentability of the invention, we placed special emphasis on ... the difference between" a
new chemical compound and a known compound and on the important characteristics of the
new compound. Id.
258. See H.E. Potts, Invention and Graduated Validity, 24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 629, 631
(1942) (citing KENT'S COMMENTARY 50, 108 (1906)).
259. See id. at 631-33 (emphasis added) (describing the evolution in Isay's Patentgesetz
treatise between 1911 and 1926).
260. See Fasse, supra note 257, at 28.
261. See Patentgesetz [German Patent Act], May 9, 1961, I at § 1(2)-(3), reprinted and
translated in DR. J-DETLEv FRHR. VON UEXKOLL, GERMAN PATENT LAW, UTILITY MODEL
LAW AND TRADE MARK LAW 9 (1963); Beier, supra note 244, at 425-28.
262. See Beier, supra note 244, at 425-28.
263. See West, supra note 257, at 622-24. Section 6 of the 1961 German Patent Act
specifically referenced patented processes. See Patentgesetz [German Patent Act], May 9,
1961, I at § 6, reprinted and translated in DR. J-DETLEV FRHR. VON UEXKOLL, GERMAN
PATENT LAW, UTILITY MODEL LAW AND TRADE MARK LAW 9 (1963) ("If the patent has been
granted in respect of a process, its effect shall extend to the products directly obtained by that
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effect seems to have been very influential, for it appeared to varying
degrees in the interpretation of other Continental patent laws, includ-
ing France.26
As Europe entered the period of intensive integration between
1960 and 1973, the issue of patentability was increasingly seen in
terms of a divergence between a British and a German approach.265
To be determined, then, was the degree to which an integrated Euro-
pean approach to patent law would adopt the standards for invention
developed according to the German approach and whether the ques-
tion of patentability would revolve around the nature of invention or,
instead, be resolved according to formally separated inquiries of in-
vention (interpreted broadly), novelty, utility, and inventive step, as in
the British approach.
B. One Hundred Years of Integration: 1873-1973
The foundations for the integration of European patent law were
laid in 1873 with the meeting of an international congress for the pro-
tection of industrial property, held in Vienna.266 This led, in 1883, to
the execution of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (Paris Convention).267 The Paris Convention created a "Un-
ion for the protection of industrial property" amongst its member
process."). In the field of chemical inventions, German patent lawyers distinguished between
"original processes," processes which themselves met the standards of invention through the
establishment of some technical advantage resulting from the process, and "analogy proc-
esses," processes which did not meet the standards of invention in their own right, but which
resulted in a product with a superior technical effect. See West, supra note 257, at 622-23.
264. See Weinstein, supra note 242, at 787 (describing the addition of "non-
obviousness" as a requirement for patentability in the new French patent law of 1968, and
stating that this added a third condition of patentability, in addition to novelty and technical
effect); Host-Madsen, supra note 247, at 164.
The Danish patent claim should characterize the invention as salient from the clos-
est prior art .... In other words, if certain features are claimed as distinguishing
over the prior art, it should be shown in the specification that these features as such
result in a new technical effect.
Id.
265. See Potts, supra note 258, at 629.
266. See Michael N. Meller, The Patent Cooperation Treaty - Utopia or Millenium, 49
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 565, 567 (1967).
267. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/
trtdocs_wo020.html [hereinafter Paris Convention]. See M. VAN EMPEL, THE GRANTING OF
EUROPEAN PATENTS 4 (1975). At present, 169 nations are contracting parties to the Paris
Convention, including the United States. See WIPO, TREATIES AND CONTRACTING PARTIES,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/enlShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty-id=2 (last visited Sept. 22,
2005).
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states 268 and laid down the basic principle of "national treatment,"
which required member states to accord to nationals of other member
states the same treatment under patent law as accorded their own na-
tionals.269 The Paris Convention established an elaborate governance
structure for the Union 270 and created an international organization to
perform administrative tasks. 27' Finally, the Paris Convention specifi-
cally permitted countries of the Union to enter into additional "special
agreements for the protection of industrial property," as long as these
agreements did not "contravene" the provisions of the Convention.2 72
The first stage in substantive harmonization of patentability re-
quirements was achieved by the Nordic countries of Denmark,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden. 273 Beginning in 1938, and continuing
after 1950, these nations collaborated in interpreting and unifying their
patent laws. 274 In 1968, new patent laws, with substantially identical
content, went into effect in each of these countries.275 Under these
laws, an "invention . . .susceptible of industrial exploitation" 276 was
268. See Paris Convention, supra note 267, art. l(1). "Industrial property" within the
meaning of the Paris Convention includes patents, utility models, industrial designs, trade-
marks, trade names, service marks, indications of source or origin and the prohibition against
unfair competition. See id. art. 1(2).
269. See id. art. 2; VAN EMPEL, supra note 267, at 4-5. In effect, this prevented states
from discriminating against each other in the grant of patents to non-citizens and from requir-
ing reciprocity in patent law before according equal treatment to non-citizens. See id.
270. See Paris Convention, supra note 267, arts. 13-16.
271. See id. art. 15. Between 1893 and 1967, the international organization that admin-
istered the Union was the Bureaux Internationaux R~unis pour la Protection de la Propritj
Intellectuelle (BIRPI). See VAN EMPEL, supra note 267, at 7 n.29. BIRPI also administered
the Union created by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, revised July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. Un-
der the Union created by the Berne Convention, member states agreed to a minimum substan-
tive level of protection for literary, scientific, and artistic works and to reciprocal national pro-
tection at or above such minimum levels. See Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein,
Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements,
12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 769, 778-81 (1997). In 1967, the Paris Convention and the
Berne Convention were amended to provide that WIPO would administer the conventions.
See id. at 779, 781. WIPO was created through the execution of the multilateral Convention
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1770, 828
U.N.T.S. 3, and presently administers twenty-three treaties and conventions relating to intel-
lectual property. See WIPO, WIPO-ADMINISTERED TREATIES, http://www.wipo.int/treaties
/en/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2005). WIPO operates as a specialized agency of the United Na-
tions. See WIPO, ABOUT WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited Sept. 22,
2005).
272. See Paris Convention, supra note 267, at art. 19.
273. See VAN EMPEL, supra note 267, at 9-10; Fredrik Neumeyer, Unification of Euro-
pean Patent Legislation on the Common Market, 24 MOD. L. REV. 725, 726 (1961).
274. See Neumeyer, supra note 273, at 726.
275. See vAN EMPEL, supra note 267, at 9-10; Onn, supra note 247, at 85-88.
276. Onn, supra note 247, at 216 (quoting Nordic Patent Act § 1).
41
Ford: Alchemy and Patentability: Technology, "Useful Arts," and the Chi
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
patentable, as long as it "differ[ed] essentially from what was known
before the filing date of the patent application." '277 The requirement of
industrial exploitation was interpreted broadly, even to the extent of
including governmental activities. 278 The concept of invention was
founded on the German principles emphasizing technical character
and technical effect.279
In 1947, France and the Benelux countries of Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, and Luxembourg, created an institute for novelty searches
centered in The Hague. 280 For France, this signaled the beginning of a
shift to granting patents on the basis of an examination rather than on
the basis of registration, although this shift would not be completed
until 1968.281 Most countries that followed the French approach to
patents generally, including Belgium and Italy, followed the French
registration system rather than conducting an examination prior to is-
suance of the patent.282 However, the registration countries gradually
realized that the lack of an examination prior to issuance tended to
make their patents weaker than patents issued in countries with ex-
amination requirements. 283 This created an incentive to make the tran-
sition to an examination system.284
In 1949, efforts directed to the development of a European patent
began with the creation of the Council of Europe and the French sub-
mission of a plan for development.285 Although this plan was rejected,
277. Id. at 216-17 (quoting Nordic Patent Act § 2). Because anything made public in
writing or in use, anywhere in the world, could defeat "novelty" under this provision, the
Nordic countries are considered to have adopted an absolute standard of novelty. See id. at
219. Other countries that have adopted an absolute standard of novelty are France, Italy, and
the Netherlands. See Kurt E. Laude, A Step Toward a European Patent: The Common Market
Patent, 42 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 698, 700 (1960).
278. See Onn, supra note 247, at 218-19.
279. See id. at 220-21.
280. See VAN EMPEL, supra note 267, at 6-7; Neumeyer, supra note 273, at 726. The
institute created by the 1947 convention became known as the Institut International des Bre-
vets. See vAN EMPEL, supra note 267, at 6.
281. See vAN EMPEL, supra note 267, at 5-6; Weinstein, supra note 242, at 781-82.
282. See Franzosi, supra note 245, at 37; Gevers, supra note 246, at 30-31.
283. See VAN EMPEL, supra note 267, at 6.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 10-11. The inspiration for creation of the Council of Europe was a 1946
speech given by Winston Churchill in Zurich, Switzerland, in which Mr. Churchill proposed
the creation of a "United States of Europe." See Winston Churchill, Prime Minister, United
Kingdom, Address at the University of Zurich (Sept. 19, 1946), available at
http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about-coe/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2005). The treaty known as the
Statute of the Council of the Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, was signed in London
and formally established the Council of Europe. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE COE IN BRIEF,
CONVENTIONS, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/enfrreaties/Html/001.htm (last visited Sept.
22, 2005). The Council of Europe is presently comprised of forty-six member states, span-
[Vol. 42
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the Consultative Assembly that formed to consider it continued meet-
ing, and consensus began developing around the patentability har-
monization proposal articulated in plans submitted in 1953 and
1954.286 Although consensus ultimately broke down over the institu-
tional framework for granting and administering European patents, the
substantive proposal survived.287  This proposal for a harmonized ap-
proach to patentability nominally included elements of both the Brit-
ish and German approaches, combining novelty, inventive step, and
industrial application.28 8 However, in moving the focus away from the
nature of invention to the separate requirement of an inventive step,
the proposal was strongly influenced by the British approach.289 In
1963, this "harmonized" approach to patentability was embodied in
the Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive
Law (Strasbourg Convention),29 which continues to be administered
by the Council of Europe. 29 1 Although the Strasbourg Convention did
not enter into force until 1980,292 it exerted a wide-ranging influence
on the harmonization of patentability requirements in Europe after
1963.293
ning most of eastern and western Europe. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE COE IN BRIEF,
MEMBER STATES, http://www.coe.int/TF/E/Com/AboutCoe/Memberstates/default.asp (last
visited Sept. 22, 2005).
286. See VAN EMPEL, supra note 267, at 11.
287. See id. at 11-12
288. See id.
289. It appears that an earlier version of the proposal may have retained the German
requirements of inventive height (Erfindungshohe) and technical advance (technischer
Fortschritt). See Neumeyer, supra note 273, at 727 n.5.
A draft for an international (European) convention as to rules for patentability and
exemptions from patentability, conditions of novelty of inventions, so-called prior
right to an invention, test of sufficient technical progress ("Erfindungshdhe") and
shape of patent claims, has been prepared and will be discussed in the Council of
Europe meeting in November 1961.
Id.
290. Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law, Nov. 27,
1963, 1249 U.N.T.S. 369, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulez
Vous.asp?NT=047&CM=8&CL=ENG [hereinafter Strasbourg Convention]. Article I of the
Strasbourg Convention provides that "patents shall be granted for inventions which are sus-
ceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step." See
id. art. 1.
291. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CONVENTIONS, STRASBOURG CONVENTION,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=047&CM=8&CL=ENG
(last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
292. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CONVENTIONS, STRASBOURG CONVENTION, LIST OF
MEMBER STATES AND RATIFICATIONS, http://conventions.coe.intiTreaty/Commun/Cherch
Sig.asp?NT=\047&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG (status as of Sept. 22, 2005).
293. See Convention Establishing a European System for the Grant of Patents, First Pre-
liminary Draft art. 9(1), Jan. 13-Jan. 16, reprinted in I INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT
L. 80, 87 [hereinafter First Preliminary Draft] ("European patents shall be granted for any in-
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In 1957, the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC Treaty)29 4 was signed in Rome by the Benelux countries,
as well as Italy, France, and Germany.295 In 1960, Austria, Denmark,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom
executed the Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation,296 forming an "outer seven" to the inner six countries of the
EEC Treaty.297 The extent of economic integration promised by these
conventions naturally created a perceived need for greater substantive
harmonization of industrial property law among the inner six and the
outer seven. 298 Following several years of its rumored existence, a
first Draft Convention for a European Patent Law (1962 Draft Con-
vention), providing for an integrated patent law for the EEC countries,
was published and circulated.29  The substantive patentability re-
quirements contained in the 1962 Draft Convention were essentially
identical to those contained in the Strasbourg Convention: novelty, in-
ventive step, and industrial application.3" Although the 1962 Draft
Convention collapsed in 1964 due to disagreements as to how non-
EEC countries might become members,30 1 commentators immediately
ventions which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an
inventive step."); MEMORANDUM ON THE SETtrING UP OF A EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE GRANT
OF PATENTS, May 13, 1969, reprinted in Romuald Singer, The European Patent Enters a New
Phase, 1 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 19 app. at 26-31 (stating that the rules of
law concerning patentability to be provided in the proposed Convention should be based on
the Strasbourg Convention as well as the Draft Convention relating to a European Patent Law
of 1962); Kurt Haertel, The Draft Conventions for a European System for the Grant of Pat-
ents and for the European Patent for the Common Market, 1 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 289, 295 (1970); see also infra note 299 and accompanying text.
294. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11.
295. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 7 (1993). A separate treaty establishing a European Atomic Energy Com-
munity was signed at the same time. See id. These two treaties became effective upon ratifi-
cation by these "inner six" member states in 1958 and, together with the European Coal and
Steel Community, constituted the foundation of the "European Community." See id. at 5-8.
The Benelux union was conceived in 1944 London by exiled leaders of Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands. See id. at 3. A Customs Convention between these three coun-
tries became effective in 1948 and was followed by a treaty establishing a common trading
area in 1958. See id.
296. European Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 3.
297. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 295, at 7.
298. See Laude, supra note 277, at 698; Neumeyer, supra note 273, at 725.
299. See Gert Kolle, The Patentable Invention in the European Patent Convention, 5
INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 140, 142 (1974); Leonard J. Robbins, The European
Patent Convention-Some Present Viewpoints of the European Patent Profession, 45 J. PAT.
OFF. SoC'y 295, 296 (1963); Singer, supra note 293, at 19.
300. See Kolle, supra note 299, at 142.
301. See Robbins, supra note 299; Singer, supra note 293, at 20.
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recognized that the patentability requirements contained in the 1962
Draft Convention constituted a strange combination of national tradi-
tions, which tended nevertheless in the direction of the British ap-
proach.30 2
In 1967, a draft Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) was published
and circulated.3 °3 Unlike the 1962 Draft Convention and the Stras-
bourg Convention, the PCT had global ambitions. °4 It provided for
two phases, the first of which would integrate the patent application
process to a limited extent, and the second of which would provide for
the harmonization of international patentability requirements in accor-
dance with the compromise reached by the 1962 Draft Convention and
the Strasbourg Convention, namely the elements of novelty, industrial
applicability, and inventive step.305 However, the PCT contained a
slight revision of this compromise language specifically designed to
attract the Americans: inventive step was explicitly equated with non-
obviousness and industrial application was equated with usefulness.30 6
Thus, the American approach to patentability was "harmonized" with
the British and German approaches.3 7 However, as with the 1962
Draft Convention, commentators recognized the difficulty inherent in
an attempt to weld together several divergent patent law traditions un-
der the rubric of an international certificate of patentability. 308
In 1968, France enacted a substantially revised patent law, the
first major revision since 1844.109 In addition to the introduction of
302. See Michael Klotz, A Great Opportunity Lost?--The New Draft Relating to a
European Patent Law, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 416, 417 (1963). According to Mr. Klotz, "the
Draft considerably raises the standard of patentability and appears to change the entire em-
phasis. It requires the presence of an inventive step, defined as non-obviousness over the art,
rather than the presence of a new technical effect, as is the rule in the present German and
Dutch practice." Id.
303. See Meller, supra note 266, at 565. The PCT was executed in Washington in
1970. See WIPO, TREATIES AND CONTRACTING PARTIES, THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY,
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/atoc.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2005). The PCT is
currently administered by WIPO and enjoys the participation of 126 contracting parties. See
WIPO, TREATIES AND CONTRACTING PARTIES, THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY:
CONTRACTING PARTIES, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResultsjsp?lang=en&treaty
_id=6 (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
304. See Meller, supra note 266, at 565.
305. See id. at 569-81.
306. See id. at 575-77.
307. See id. at 581-87.
308. See id. (describing the "attempt of the drafters of [the PCT] to cover in their con-
sideration all patent theories by trying to pull an umbrella over the two ends of the patent phi-
losophy spectrum as best illustrated by the U.S. Patent System on the one hand and the Ger-
man on the other").
309. See Robert Depelsenaire, France, in EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra
note 245, (referring to Loi du 2 janvier 1968, the French patent law); Birgitt A. Pagenberg,
2005]
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pre-grant examinations as to novelty,310 the new French Patent Law in-
troduced the concept of inventive step as a condition of patentabil-
ity.31' In fact, the requirements for patentability articulated in the new
French law were precisely the substantive elements that had been
elaborated in the 1962 Draft Convention, the Strasbourg Convention,
and the PCT: novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability. 12 In
addition, the new French Patent Law did something interesting; it ex-
plicitly prohibited the patentability of "programs of a calculating ma-
chine."3 3
In the fall of that same year, the French Government revived the
effort to develop a European patent.314 In the spring of 1969, shortly
after the new French Patent Law went into effect, a Committee of Ex-
perts of the inner six EEC member states formed under the Chairman-
ship of Kurt Haertel, then President of the German Patent Office.315 In
order to prevent Europe's institutional complexity, the divide between
EEC and non-EEC countries, from harming the effort to develop a
pan-European patent law, the Committee of Experts proposed a bifur-
cated strategy.3 16 First, a European patent and the necessary attendant
Patentability of Computer Programs on the National and International Level, 5 INT'L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1, 32 (1974); Weinstein, supra note 242, at 778, 781.
310. See Weinstein, supra note 242, at 781-82. Because of the limited resources of the
French Patent Office at the time the new law became effective, examinations were initially
performed by the Institut International des Brevets in The Hague. See supra note 280 and
accompanying text.
311. See Depelsenaire, supra note 309, at 9, 10-11, 125-29; Weinstein, supra note 242,
at 787-88.
312. See Depensenaire, supra note 309, at 11 ("Under the new law, you have three basic
requirements: the invention must be new; it must have some industrial character; it must show
inventive activity.").
313. "[N]ot regarded as technical inventions are... programs and series of instructions
for the performance of operations of a calculating machine." Cour d'appel [CA] [Regional
Court of Appeal] Paris, May 22, 1973, reprinted and translated in 5 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 216-19 (1974) (omission in original) (quoting art. 7 of the French Patent
Law of 1968); see Pagenberg, supra note 309, at 32.
314. See Singer, supra note 293, at 20-21. "The French Government then took the ini-
tiative and awakene' Sleeping Beauty." Haertel, supra note 293, at 290.
315. See Singer, supra note 293, at 21. Mr. Haertel exercised an enormous degree of
influence over the process of developing the European patent approach. See VAN EMPEL, su-
pra note 267, at 16. In 1960, he proposed a European Patent Convention that would enable
issuance of a European patent, which would coexist, without supplanting, national patents.
See id. at 15-16; lain C. Baillie, Where Goes Europe? The European Patent, 58 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 153, 154 (1976). Furthermore, he served as Chairman of the working group that de-
veloped the 1962 Draft Convention. See VAN EMPEL, supra note 267, at 16. In addition to
serving as Chairman of the EEC Committee of Experts, in 1969 he was unanimously elected
to serve as Chairman of the Brussels Conference to develop the European patent. See Singer,
supra note 293, at 21.
316. See id.
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institutions would be created pursuant to a convention that would be
open to all European states, EEC or non-EEC." This patent would be
granted on the basis of a uniform standard of patentability by a Euro-
pean Patent Office, but it would coexist with national patents of the
member states and would be subject to interpretation and enforcement
in accordance with the laws of member states." 8 Second, for EEC
member states, a Community Patent would be created pursuant to a
second convention.1 9 This Community Patent would entirely sup-
plant national patents, resulting in uniformity over all stages of the
patent life. 20 Thus, a compromise was achieved between the EEC and
non-EEC states which, with the added impetus of French backing, en-
abled moving forward on the project to develop a European patent.
In May of 1969, EEC and non-EEC countries met in Brussels to
participate in the Inter-Governmental Conference to Establish a Euro-
pean System for the Grant of Patents (1969 Conference).3 21 The basis
for the work of the 1969 Conference was a memorandum issued ear-
lier that month.322 This memorandum stated that a European patent
would only be possible if the rules concerning patentability were uni-
fied according to "international regulation." '323 Therefore it was de-
termined that the convention to be developed "must of necessity in-
clude provisions of this nature."324 The basis for these provisions was
to be the 1962 Draft Convention and the Strasbourg Convention.3 25 In
1970, patentability language was approved by the participants in a
second Inter-Governmental Conference held in Luxembourg.3 26 These
provisions were incorporated into a preliminary draft Convention Es-
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 19. Seventeen countries participated in this Conference: Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Tur-
key. See id. In addition to Kurt Haertel, who served as Chairman of the Conference, the fol-
lowing served as Vice-Chairmen: Gordon V. Grant, Comptroller General of the English Pat-
ent Office; Francoise Savignon, Director of the French Patent Office; and Antonio Femdndez-
Mazarambroz, Director of the Spanish Patent Office. See id. at 21-22. Organizations permit-
ted to observe were BIRPI, the Council of Europe, the Commission of the European Commu-
nities (EEC), and the International Patent Institute, or Institut International des Brevets. See
id. at 22.
322. See id. at 21-22.
323. MEMORANDUM ON THE SETTING UP OF A EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE GRANT OF
PATENTS, supra note 293, at 26-31.
324. See id.
325. See id.
326. See id. at 24.
20051
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tablishing a European System for the Grant of Patents (1970 Draft
Convention), which was approved by the Luxembourg Inter-
Governmental Conference.3 27
The provisions relating to patentability appeared in article 9 of the
1970 Draft Convention.3 28  Article 9(1) recited the language of the
Strasbourg Convention nearly verbatim: "European patents shall be
granted for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial applica-
tion, which are new and which involve an inventive step."329 Article
9(2), on the other hand, was influenced by the PCT and provided a list
of items that were definitionally excluded from article 9(1).33 0 In the
case of the PCT, the excluded list operated at a relatively pragmatic
level to exempt international searching authorities from having to un-
dertake a prior art search in the case of certain particularly difficult
items.33' However, when incorporated into the patentability provi-
sions of the 1970 Draft Convention, the excluded list helped to deline-
ate the scope of a patentable invention.33 2 Although the excluded list
of the 1970 Draft was relatively limited,333 by 1971 it had been ex-
panded to include computer programs and the presentation of informa-
tion.334 In 1972, the excluded list was defined more precisely and ex-
panded further.335 In 1973, just prior to adoption of the final text in
Munich, the German delegation proposed addition of a third article to
provide an interpretive rule for the excluded list; only where a Euro-
pean patent application or European patent related to the excluded
items as such would patentability be denied.3 36
And thus, built on the foundation of the Strasbourg Convention
and the 1962 Draft Convention, and supplemented by the PCT, subject
to no small amount of back-room bargaining, a standard for pat-
327. See First Preliminary Draft, supra note 293.
328. See id. at 87-88.
329. See id. at 87. The 1970 Draft Convention stated in the notes that article 9(1) corre-
sponded to article 1 of the Strasbourg Convention. See id. at 88.
330. See Kolle, supra note 299, at 143.
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. See First Preliminary Draft, supra note 293, at 87-88. The items excluded were:
(a) scientific and mathematical theories as such; (b) the mere discovery of materi-
als occurring in nature; (c) purely aesthetic creations; (d) commercial, financial or
book-keeping methods, the rules of playing games and other systems, in so far as
they are of a purely intellectual nature; (e) therapeutic or surgical methods for
treatment of the human or animal body, and diagnostic methods.
See id.
334. See Kolle, supra note 299, at 143.
335. See id.
336. See id.
[Vol. 42
48
California Western Law Review, Vol. 42 [2005], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol42/iss1/3
2005] ALCHEMY AND PATENTABILITY 97
entability of European patents was defined.33 7 On October 5, 1973,
the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC)338 was signed
in Munich.33 9 The provisions of the EPC relating to patentability are
contained in articles 52 to 57. Article 52 corresponds to article 9 of
the 1970 Draft Convention and provides as follows:
(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are sus-
ceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an in-
ventive step.
(2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within
the meaning of paragraph 1:
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;
(b) aesthetic creations;
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing
games or doing business, and programs for computers;
(d) presentations of information.
(3) The provisions of paragraph 2 shall exclude patentability of the sub-
ject-matter or activities referred to in that provision only to the extent to
which a European patent application or European patent relates to such
subject-matter or activities as such.34°
The EPC became effective in signatory member states in 1977.341
It is currently in force among thirty member states, including all but
two of the states that are members of the European Union.342
337. See generally Kurt Haertel, The Munich Diplomatic Conference on European Pat-
ent Law, 4 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 271 (1973).
338. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, T.S. No. 20, 13 I.L.M.
270, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/contents.html [hereinafter
EPC].
339. See Haertel, supra note 337, at 277. Fourteen nations originally signed the EPC:
Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, Greece (with reser-
vations), Ireland, Italy, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Swit-
zerland. See id. The EPC remained open for signature to additional nations who had partici-
pated in the Munich Conference until 1974 and for accession after that date. See id. at 277-
78. At the time of signing, nine of these nations were EEC member states (the inner six plus
Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain) and five were not. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 295,
at 422. Denmark, Ireland, and Great Britain joined the EEC in 1973. See EUROPEAN UNION,
THE EUROPEAN UNION AT A GLANCE, http://europa.eu.int/abc/index-en.htm (last visited Sept.
22, 2005). In addition to all of his previous activities in relation to the project to develop a
European patent, Mr. Haertel chaired the Main Committee that dealt with the finalization of
the legal provisions of the EPC, as well as the Committee of the Whole that coordinated the
work of the three Main Committees and transmitted the final document to the Plenary for vot-
ing. See Haertel, supra note 337, at 272-73.
340. EPC, supra note 338, art. 52 (emphasis added).
341. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 295, at 422.
342. See EUROPEAN PATENT ORGANIZATION, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, http://ac.european-
patent-office.org/legal-foundations/index.en.php (last updated Jan. 19, 2005). The two ex-
ceptions are Latvia and Malta. See id. The European Union represents the further integration
49
Ford: Alchemy and Patentability: Technology, "Useful Arts," and the Chi
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
The primary institution created by the EPC is the European Patent
Organization, which is comprised of the European Patent Office
(EPO) and an Administrative Council. 343 The EPO is charged with
carrying out the European Patent Organization's primary task, which
is the granting of patents according to the terms of the EPC, under the
Administrative Council's supervision. 34  The EPO is divided into
seven Divisions, one of which is the Boards of Appeal.34 5 Under the
terms of the EPC, the Boards of Appeal are responsible for examining
appeals from several divisions of the EPO, including the Examining
Divisions and the Opposition Divisions.34
C. Enter the Computer, Its Programs, and Their
Inventors: 1965-1975
Even before the EPC was signed, controversy began to rage over
the inclusion of "programs for computers" as an item excluded from
patentability under article 52.347 According to the General Rapporteur
who prepared the final EPC draft for signature, the reason for exclu-
sion was to eliminate a particularly controversial issue.3 8 Whether the
intention was merely to prevent the issue from derailing the EPC or to
settle the issue completely is unclear.349 What is relatively clear is that
certain of the exclusions were intended to codify categories of items
that were uniformly regarded as non-patentable, in order to bring
some predictability to future decisions of the EPO,350 and that com-
puter programs were not among these uniformly-regarded catego-
of the European communities created in 1957. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 295, at 1-19.
It was created by the Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinaf-
ter TEU], signed at Maastricht. See id. at 16. In addition to the nine EEC member states as of
1973 who signed the EPC, Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986), Austria, Finland and
Sweden (1995) have become members of the EEC/European Union. See EUROPEAN UNION,
THE EUROPEAN UNION AT A GLANCE, http://europa.eu.int/abc/index-en.htm (last visited Sept.
22, 2005). In 2004, ten additional states joined the European Union. See id.
343. See EPC, supra note 338, arts. 4(1)-4(2).
344. See id. art. 4(3).
345. See id. art. 15(f).
346. See id. art. 21(1).
347. See Beier, supra note 244, at 434.
348. See Kolle, supra note 299, at 150-51 (citing Mr. van Bentham, President of the
Netherlands Patent Office and General Rapporteur for the Munich Diplomatic Conference);
Haertel, supra note 337, at 273.
349. See Kolle, supra note 299, at 150-51; Pagenberg, supra note 309, at 42.
350. See Kolle, supra note 299, at 144. According to Kolle, these included the exclu-
sion of discoveries, scientific theories, aesthetic creations, purely mental acts, and business
activities. See id.
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ries.351  The participants refused to adopt a compromise solution,
which would have been to place the exclusion of computer programs
in the implementing regulations of the EPC, subject to amendment by
the Administrative Council.35 2 At least one commentator speculated
that the statutory exclusion represented a "concession" to France,
which had recently excluded "programs of a calculating machine"
from patentability under its Patent Law of 1968. 353 However, this may
not be completely fair since, as early as 1971, France indicated its
willingness to consider patent-like protection for computer pro-
grams. 354
Unfortunately, the need to make a decision as to whether to in-
clude computer programs in the EPC's list of excluded items arose at
a time when member states had not yet taken a clear position on
whether computer programs were patentable inventions. Even France,
which appeared to have the clearest position on the issue, had not
statutorily excluded computer programs from patentability, but rather
programs of a calculating machine.3 55 It was not until May of 1973
that a decision of the Cour d'Appel de Paris determined that programs
of a calculating machine included computer programs and that the leg-
islature had intended to exclude such programs from patentability in
the Patent Act of 1968.356 The court reasoned that because the Act
made rejection for non-patentability dependent upon a determination
that an invention was "manifestly" lacking in technical character,357
the legislature's separate exclusion of computer programs from pat-
entability meant that the legislature had determined such programs to
manifestly lack the requisite technical character. 358 The court inter-
351. See id. at 150. "In spite of the nearly unanimous refusal of a naked exclusion of
computer programs by the interested associations and organizations during the several hear-
ings, the Governmental Conference settled for final establishment of such a rule in the
[EPC]." Id. (footnote omitted).
352. See id.
353. See id. at 151.
354. See Pagenberg, supra note 309, at 38-39. Pagenberg discusses France's participa-
tion in an international meeting on computer programs held in Geneva in 1971. See id. Al-
though France specifically pointed to the position taken in its Patent Act of 1968, it indicated
a willingness to consider "legal protection by other means." See id. at 39 n. 134. The partici-
pants in this meeting recommended that, at minimum, any protection scheme adopted should
prevent unauthorized use of computer programs. See id. at 39.
355. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
356. See Cour d'appel [CA] [Regional Court of Appeal] Paris, May 22, 1973, reprinted
and translated in 5 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 216-19 (1974).
357. Loi du 2 janvier 1968, art. 16(5), as discussed in Cour d'appel [CA] [Regional
Court of Appeal] Paris, May 22, 1973, reprinted and translated in 5 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGrrL. 216-19 (1974) at 218-19.
358. See Cour d'appel [CA] [Regional Court of Appeal] Paris, May 22, 1973, reprinted
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preted the legislature's determination to extend to all computer-
implemented inventions; even "programs or series of instructions" that
controlled the "performance of industrial processes, thus producing
technical results," were not patentable, according to the court's inter-
pretation of the Act.359
In the same month that the French case was decided, the
Bundespatentgericht (German Federal Patent Court) issued a decision
that pertained to the patentability of computer programs.3" The in-
vention claimed in this case was virtually identical to that deemed un-
patentable by the American Supreme Court only one year previously
in Gottschalk v. Benson, namely a method of converting decimal nu-
merals into pure binary numerals.36' Nevertheless, the German Fed-
eral Patent Court determined that it was unnecessary to make a deter-
mination as to the question of whether computer programs may be
patentable in the abstract, since the case could be decided under
Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court) precedent.362
Having thus avoided this "highly complex fundamental question," the
German Federal Patent Court held the invention to be patentable based
on the German Federal Supreme Court's holding in the Rote Taube
(Red Dove) case, which appeared to signal a move away from techni-
cality as a requirement for patentability in the context of a biological
invention.363  Folowing this precedent somewhat ambivalently, the
German Federal Patent Court reasoned that in any case the invention
possessed technical character because it constituted an application of
technical means (parts of a data processor) to accomplish a technical
purpose (conversion of decimal to binary numbers).364
in English in 5 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 216-19 (1974) at 218-19.
359. See id. at 218. "It is evident, therefore, that the legislature has clearly expressed its
intent not to regard programs or series of instructions as inventions of a technical character,
regardless of their purpose or result." Id.
360. Bundespatentgeritcht [BPatGE] [German Federal Patent Court] May 28, 1973, re-
printed and translated in 5 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 211-16 (1974).
361. See id. at 211; supra notes 131-143 and accompanying text. In fact, an application
filed in America was rejected based on the holding of Benson. See Bundespatentgeritcht
[BPatGE] [German Federal Patent Court] May 28, 1973, reprinted and translated in 5 INT'L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 211, 213 (1974).
362. See id. at 213.
363. See id. at 213-14; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 27,
1969, reprinted and translated in I INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 136-42 (1970).
The invention in this case concerned a method for breeding doves. See id. at 136. Reasoning
that the "laws governing biological phenomena and forces" originate in physical phenomena
to the same degree as laws and forces relating to inanimate matter, the court held that it was
"immaterial" to the question of patentability whether the word technology could be applied to
such biological laws. See id. at 138.
364. See Bundespatentgeritcht [BPatGE] [German Federal Patent Court] May 28, 1973,
[Vol. 42100
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Thus, the German and French courts came to diametrically op-
posed conclusions based on an application of the same criterion of
technical character. In Austria and Switzerland, respective patent of-
fices also applied this criterion, arriving at a conclusion that computer
programs were not patentable.36 5 Only the English, stubbornly persist-
ing in applying the manner of new manufactures formulation of the
Statute of Monopolies, managed to avoid wrestling with the language
of technicality, technical effect, and technical character in dealing
with computer programs.366 However, the English faced their own dif-
ficulties in fitting computer programs within the language of manufac-
ture; the best solution seemed to be to describe the invention in terms
of a machine or an apparatus, which had already been determined to
constitute a manufacture.3 67  Although this made a determination of
patentability possible, it caused the English to struggle mightily with
the form of claims.368
Therefore, while the precise nature of the challenge posed by
computer programs may have differed depending on the side of the
Channel from which it was viewed, the reality of the challenge could
not be denied. Ironically, Germany and England, nations seeming
most divided in history, tradition, and philosophy relating to patents,
both appeared to be moving in the direction of allowing computer
programs to be patented, albeit through the use of vastly differing lin-
guistic formulations. Nevertheless, the issue of computer program
reprinted and translated in 5 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 211, 214 (1974).
365. See Osterreichisches Patentamt, Beschwerdaebteilung [Austrian Patent Office,
Appeals Division] Oct. 29, 1970, reprinted and translated in 2 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 206-08 (1971).
[A] computer program relates solely to the sphere of the intellect and thus lacks all
technical character. The creative activity necessary to the formulation of a program
as well as the underlying computational process (algorithm) belongs only to the
realm of mathematics or intellectual endeavor and not to the technological arts.
Id.; Amt fur Geistiges Eigentum [Swiss Office for the Protection of Intellectual Property]
Sept. 3, 1968, reprinted and translated in 1 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 148-49
(1970) (holding that the creation of a computer program "is the result of a purely mental proc-
ess," which is preliminary to the stage at which the natural forces set in motion by the pro-
gram cause a technical effect, and that therefore a computer program is not a patentable in-
vention).
366. See In re Gevers, (1970) R.P.C. 91 (Pat. App. Tr. 1969) (Eng.); In re Badger Com-
pany, (1970) R.P.C. 36 (Pat. App. Tr. 1968) (Eng.); In re Slee and Harris, (1966) R.P.C. 194
(Pat. Ct.) (Eng.). The computer programs at issue in these cases were punch cards. See id.
367. See In re Gevers, (1970) R.P.C. 91. Thus, the early British approach contains
striking parallels to the early American approach, denying patentability to process claims as
involving "intellectual information," but allowing claims to a new machine created by running
software on that machine. See Soma et al., supra note 7, at 30-32.
368. See In re Gevers, (1970) R.P.C. 91; In re Badger Company, (1970) R.P.C. 36 (Pat.
App. Tr. 1968); In re Slee and Harris, (1966) R.P.C. 194 (Pat. Ct.).
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patentability was too new for any stable precedent to develop, and in
1973 the EPC intervened.
D. Merging Inventive Step and Technical Effect: 1975-1990
In 1975, the Convention for the European Patent for the Common
Market (Community Patent Convention) was signed in Luxem-
bourg.369 The intention of the Community Patent Convention, which
constituted the second stage in the two-stage strategy for European
patent integration developed by Kurt Haertel and his Committee of
Experts in 1969, 370 was to create a single patent for all EEC coun-
tries.3 71  However, this Community Patent Convention required
unanimous ratification among the EEC countries in order to become
effective,3 72 and so it was doubtful from the beginning that the Com-
munity Patent Convention would ever have an impact.
Despite the doubtful viability of the Community Patent Conven-
tion, the pace of integration between 1960 and 1975 had been striking.
The impressiveness of these changes, combined with a recognition
that the EPC was likely to become effective soon, led Germany and
the United Kingdom to undertake, between 1976 and 1977, radical re-
vision of their patent laws to conform them to the EPC's substantive
provisions.3 73 As of 1981, both German and United Kingdom patent
law contained provisions substantively identical to article 52 of the
EPC.3 74 The change seemed more dramatic for Germany, at least as
far as patentability was concerned, because the standards of technical
advance and technical effect were not mentioned and the English in-
ventive step was explicitly incorporated.3 75 Commentators concluded
369. Baillie, supra note 315, at 153, 169.
370. See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text.
371. See Baillie, supra note 315, at 169, 183.
372. See id. at 155.
373. See Bradford C. Auerbach, Biotechnology Patent Law Developments in Great
Britain and the United States: Analysis of a Hypothetical Patent Claim for a Synthesized Vi-
rus, 6 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 563, 571-72 (1983); Frithjof E. Muller & Harold C.
Wegner, The 1976 German Patent Law, 59 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 89, 90 (1977).
374. Section 1(2) of the British 1977 Patents Act, as amended, is substantively identical
to article 52(2) and article 52(3) of the EPC. See Patents Act, 1977, ch. 37, § 1(2) (Eng.),
available at http://www.jenkins-ip.com/patlaw/pa77.htm#s 1; EPC, supra note 338, art. 52(2)-
(3). Similarly, the Federal Republic of Germany's Patent Act of 1981 contains language sub-
stantively identical to the EPC. See Patentgesetz [German Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BGB1.
1981 I at 1, § 1(2)-(3), translation available at http://www.ip-firm.de/patentact.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 22, 2005); EPC, supra note 338, art. 52(2)-(3).
375. The German law as reformulated in 1976 delineated the standard of patentability in
terms identical to those contained in the Strasbourg Convention, the 1962 Draft Convention,
the PCT, and the EPC. "Patents shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of
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that the standards relating to technical character had been eliminated
from German law3 76 and, as a result, probably would have predicted
that the language of technical effect and technical advance would
gradually fade from the European patent law scene. Nothing would
have been further from the truth.
Not surprisingly, the questions of whether, and to what extent, in-
ventions making use of computers and their programs should be pat-
entable continued after the EPC became effective and member states
revised their laws accordingly. In 1984, the EPO established a work-
ing group to examine the problem further; 77 the recommendation of
this working group was to include technical character as one of the
criteria for determining whether an invention came within the ex-
cluded list of article 52(2) of the EPC.378 In 1985, the EPO's Guide-
lines for Examination were revised to incorporate this recommenda-
tion.379  Finding it impossible to define technical character, the
working group settled for providing examples and left it to the EPO
Boards of Appeal to develop a definition.380
The EPO Boards of Appeal had an opportunity to apply the new
standard in 1987, in VICOM/Computer-Related Invention,38' which
concerned digital processing of visual images in a computer.382 The
industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step." See MUller &
Wegner, supra note 373, at 94-95.
376. See id. at 94.
377. See Brad Sherman, The Patentability of Computer-Related Inventions in the United
Kingdom and the European Patent Office, 13(3) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 85, 88 n.32 (1991).
378. See id. at 88.
379. See id. at 88 n.32. EPO Guidelines for Examination, C-IV, § 2.2 (1985), stated as
follows:
In considering whether the subject-matter of an application is an invention within
the meaning of Article 52, paragraph 1, there are two general points the examiner
must bear in mind. Firstly, any exclusion from patentability under Article 52,
paragraph 2, applies only to the extent to which the application relates to the ex-
cluded subject-matter as such. Secondly, the examiner should disregard the form
or kind of claim and concentrate on its content in order to identify the real contri-
bution which the subject-matter claimed, considered as a whole, adds to the known
art. if this contribution is not of a technical character, there is no invention within
the meaning of Article 52, paragraph 1.... [I]f a computer program is claimed in
the form of a physical record, e.g., on a conventional tape or disc, the contribution
to the art is still no more than a computer program. In these instances the claim re-
lates to excluded subject-matter as such [and] is therefore not allowable. If on the
other hand, a computer program in combination with a computer causes the com-
puter to operate in a different way from a technical point of view, the combination
might be patentable.
In re Merrill Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. 561, 564-65 (C.A. (Civ.)) (Eng.) (emphases added).
380. See Sherman, supra note 377, at 88 & n.35.
381. Case T 208/84, VICOM/Computer-Related Invention, [1987] E.P.O.R. 74, con-
strued in In re Fujitsu Ltd., [1996] R.P.C. 511 (Pat.) (Eng.).
382. Fujitsu Ltd., [1996] R.P.C. 511, 524-25 (discussing VICOM).
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applicant claimed both a method of digitally processing such images
as well as an apparatus that was essentially a computer "programmed
to carry out" the claimed method.383 With respect to the method
claim, the Board held that it was not excluded from patentability by
articles 52(2) and (3) of the EPC as a "mathematical method."384
Finding a distinction between "abstract mathematical concepts,"
where numbers are processed to produce new numbers only, and tech-
nical processes where physical entities are manipulated to produce
new physical entities, the Board held that the exclusion of article 52(2)
only applied to the former.3 85 Thus, according to the Board, if an "ab-
stract mathematical concept[]" is used in a technical application it be-
comes patent-eligible as an invention under article 52(1) of the
EPC.386 Because the Board considered a digital image to be a physical
thing, by virtue of the fact that electrical signals caused it to be dis-
played and visually perceived, the fact that mathematical operations
were applied to such images in the applicant's invention meant that
the invention concerned a technical application, rather than a mathe-
matical method as such, and thus was patentable.3 87
Turning to the apparatus claim, the Board appeared to regard the
fact that a technical process had been implemented in a device as the
key to a determination of patentability, regardless of whether that de-
vice happened to be software or hardware.3 88 In other words, once the
Board had determined the method claim to be patent-eligible as a
technical application of a mathematical concept, the eligibility of the
computer apparatus in which that method was implemented followed
logically under the technical character standard for determining
whether the invention was an excluded computer program.
Thus, the German concept of technical character had been re-
vived. Indeed, for some it had never died. In a 1985 speech, Herr
Gunter Gall, former Director of Legal Affairs for the EPO, character-
383. Id. at 524.
384. See id. at 524-25.
385. Id. at 525.
386. Id.
387. See id.
388. See id.
The Board is of the opinion that a claim directed to a technical process which
process is carried out under the control of a program (be this implemented in
hardware or in software), cannot be regarded as relating to a computer program as
such within the meaning of Article 52(3) EPC, as it is the application of the pro-
gram for determining the sequence of steps in the process for which in effect pro-
tection is sought. Consequently, such a claim is allowable under Article 52(2)(c)
and (3) EPC.
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ized the EPC's exclusion of computer programs in article 52 as arising
out of national traditions of invention and the historical perception
that, "like discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical methods and
presentations of information, [computer programs] are not of a techni-
cal nature."38 9 Clearly the Continental approach of focusing on the na-
ture of invention in determining patentability had not been eliminated,
even with the enactment of legislation following the EPC approach
that nominally separated the issue of inventive step from patentability,
according to the British approach.
The interesting question after VICOM was what the British courts
would do, since the language of technical character was completely
foreign to them. This question was answered by the court of appeal in
1989, in In re Merrill Lynch.39 The invention claimed in Merrill
Lynch was a "data processing system" to automate trading in securi-
ties.391 In order to determine whether such an invention was pat-
entable under section 1 of the Patents Act of 1977, which corre-
sponded to article 52 of the EPC,3 92 the principal examiner looked to
the EPO's recently adopted Guidelines for Examination.393 Utilizing
what was essentially a point of novelty approach,394 the examiner rea-
soned that because the physical and systemic components of the com-
puter were "wholly conventional," the novelty and inventiveness
could only be located in the computer's program, which was unpat-
entable as such under the Patents Act of 1977 and the EPC.3 95 Deter-
mining that the means comprising the invention, which were specified
in the claim at issue, "relate to features which either would be present
in a conventional business computer system or define essential func-
tions for the performance of [a] business method," the examiner con-
cluded that the claim did not recite anything that could be viewed as
constituting a "new technical structure" or capable of producing a new
technical effect in the sense intended by the Guidelines.3 96 Thus, the
examiner rejected the invention as unpatentable.3 97 The examiner's
389. HART ET AL., supra note 5, at 9-10.
390. In reMerrill Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. 561 (C.A. (Civ.)) (Eng.).
391. Id. at 562.
392. See sources cited supra note 374.
393. See Merrill Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. at 564.
394. See supra notes 128-29, 173, 183 and accompanying text.
395. See Merrill Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. at 564.
396. Id.
397. See id.
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conclusions, as well as his reasoning, were upheld upon appeal to the
Patents Court; 39 8 the applicant then appealed to the court of appeal.
In the meantime, the court of appeal had decided In re Genen-
tech,399 which concerned interpretation of section 1 of the Patents Act
of 1977, albeit not in the context of a computer-related invention. 4°°
In deciding Genentech, however, several judges reviewed the deter-
minations in Merrill Lynch and concluded that the point of novelty
approach was incorrect.4 °' Thus, the court of appeal in Merrill Lynch
was forced to reformulate the test for determining whether an inven-
tion is patentable under section 1 of the Patents Act of 1977. 402 In do-
ing so, the court took judicial notice of VICOM as instructed by sec-
tion 91(1) of the Patents Act of 1977.03 Following the reasoning in
VICOM, the court concluded that patentability must be determined
with reference to the technical contribution or technical advance made
by the invention, relative to prior art.4" According to the court, such
technical contribution or technical advance, rather than the form of the
claim (for example, whether a process versus an apparatus is claimed),
should determine patentability. 45 In addition, however, the court rea-
soned that patentability must depend upon the end result of the inven-
tion that is claimed, regardless of technical advance.4°6 Where that re-
sult is an excluded category, the court found that there can be no
patentable invention.' 7  Reasoning that the end result of Merrill
Lynch's invention was nothing more than a method of doing business,
the court concluded that despite any technical advance that might be
achieved by the computer program, the invention was unpatentable.4 °8
Thus, the German concepts of technical advance and technical ef-
fect came to be incorporated into the British analysis of patentability
at the same time that the British requirement of an independent in-
quiry into inventive step was incorporated into German law. For the
United Kingdom, this meant that the difficulty of defining a "manner
of new manufacture" had been replaced with a new difficulty, that of
398. See id. at 565.
399. In re Genentech Inc., [1989] R.P.C. 147 (C.A. (Civ.)) (Eng.).
400. Id. at 157-58.
401. See id. at 207, 239-40, 270.
402. See Merrill Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. at 565-67.
403. Id. at 567.
404. Id. at 569.
405. See id.
406. See id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
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defining technical character.4" Moreover, this meant that several
hundred years of precedent relating to the interpretation of manufac-
tures would have to be discarded, with guidance instead to be obtained
by taking judicial notice of decisions of the EPO Boards of Appeal.4 °
On the other hand, the German courts would be able to enjoy the
benefit of years of precedent relating to the interpretation of technical
character. In the end, ironically, at least in the field of computer-
related inventions, the change may have been greater for the United
Kingdom than for Germany.
E. The Evolving Jurisprudence: 1990-2000
The EPO Technical Board of Appeal decisions following VICOM
sought to further delineate the circumstances in which a computer
program involves a technical application sufficient to defeat exclusion
under article 52 of the EPC. In IBM/Document Abstracting and Re-
trieving,4 ' the Board held that a computer program cannot be deter-
mined to involve a technical application merely by virtue of the fact
that a software program causes changes to the hardware through elec-
trical currents.4"2 Thus, the Board avoided the American approach of
asserting that computer software is patentable by virtue of the fact that
the computer becomes a new machine when software is implemented
on it.
4 13
Furthermore, the Board was clear from a relatively early stage that
the requisite technical application could be found outside of traditional
physical and industrial contexts, avoiding troublesome distinctions be-
tween computer hardware and computer software as well as the focus
on a physical transformation in an industrial process as the key to pat-
409. See In re Gale, [1991] R.P.C. 305, 328 (C.A. (Civ.)) (Eng.) (Buckley, L.J.) ("I con-
fess to having difficulty in identifying clearly the boundary line between what is and what is
not a technical problem [for purposes of defining patentability].").
410. See id. at 323.
[I]t is of the utmost importance that the interpretation given to section 1 of the
[Patents Act of 1977] by the courts of the United Kingdom, and the interpretation
given to Article 52 of the [EPC], should be the same .... When interpreting the
[British Patents Act of 1977] an English court should have due regard to decisions
of the [EPO] Board of Appeal and take them into account, although the English
court is not bound by them.
Id.
411. Case T 22/85, IBM/Document Abstracting and Retrieving, [1990] E.P.O.R. 98.
412. Case T 1173/97, IBM/Computer Programs, [2000] E.P.O.R. 219, at 228 (discuss-
ing "Document Abstracting and Retrieving/IBM").
413. See supra notes 115, 146 and accompanying text.
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entability. Thus, in SOHEI/General-Purpose Management System,4"4
the Board determined that method and apparatus claims directed to a
computer system for financial and inventory management involved
technical considerations and thus were patent-eligible under article 52
of the EPC.41 5 Noting prior cases, the Board stated that claims to a
mix of hardware and software "may or may not be patentable."4 6 The
key to patentability, according to the Board, lay in whether a contribu-
tion to the computer art could be identified, either by virtue of a tech-
nical problem to be solved or by virtue of a technical effect achieved
by the solution.417 Moreover, exclusion from patentability under arti-
cle 52 of the EPC might be avoided where "technical considerations
are to be made concerning the particulars of [an invention's] imple-
mentation."4 8 Following this logic, the Board abstracted from the fact
that the claims related to management (doing business) for purposes of
evaluating whether the claimed invention involved the requisite tech-
nical considerations, finding such technical considerations in the fact
that the claimed system allowed several data points to be input simul-
taneously in a single common form, called a transfer slip, and subse-
quently processed independently.4 19 Significantly, therefore, the req-
uisite technical considerations were identified in software, rather than
in hardware, and in the context of a financial services application,
rather than an industrial process.
In 1998, the Board issued a decision in IBM/Computer Pro-
grams.42 ° This decision is significant because it elaborated clear
guidelines for the interpretation of article 52 of the EPC with respect
to computer programs, and because the Board took explicit notice of
international developments as indicators of "trends" in the patentabil-
421 T~tiity of computer programs. In this case, the applicant claimed "[a]
method for resource recovery in a computer" running a particular ap-
plication as well as an apparatus (the computer system) for imple-
menting the method.422 In addition, however, the applicant claimed a
414. Case T 769/92, Sohei/Gen.-Purpose Mgmt. System, [1996] E.P.O.R. 253.
415. Id. at 263-64.
416. Id. at 259.
417. See id.
418. Id. According to the Board, "[tihe very need for such technical considerations im-
plies the occurrence of an, at least implicit, technical problem to be solved (Rule 27 EPC)
and, at least implicit, technical features (Rule 29 EPC) solving that technical problem." Id.
419. See id. at 260-62.
420. Case T 1173/97, IBM/Computer Programs, [2000] E.P.O.R. 219.
421. See id.
422. Id. at 221.
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"computer program product" in two forms: one stored on a "computer
usable medium" and the other "directly loadable into the internal
memory of a digital computer"; the latter comprised "software code
portions for performing the steps of' the claimed process.423 In other
words, the applicant was claiming the software program directly, in
addition to the process to be implemented by means of the software
and a computer system as implementer of the process.
The examining division of the EPO indicated that it viewed the
process and apparatus claims as acceptable, but, following then-
current Guidelines for Examination, determined that the claims to the
software product were excluded by article 52 of the EPC.424 In the
proceedings at the level of the examining division, the applicant
pointed not only to technical considerations, but also to economic cir-
cumstances and "international developments. 4 25 With respect to the
latter, the applicant urged the examining division to consider devel-
opments in the USPTO and the Japanese Patent Office,4 26 as well as
article 27 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS),4 27 which provides that "patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive
step and are capable of industrial application.4 28 The examining di-
vision responded that its only obligation was to follow the law estab-
lished by the EPC, including the Guidelines for Examination estab-
lished by the EPO.429
Although the Board ended its consideration of these international
developments by concluding that "the only source of substantive pat-
ent law for examining European patent applications at this moment is
423. Id.
424. Id. at 221-22.
425. Id. at 222. With respect to the technical character of the invention, the applicant
claimed, and the examining division appeared to agree, that it was to be found in a specific
command sequence, namely in software programming. See id. at 223. Therefore, the appli-
cant argued, it is arbitrary to determine claims to be ineligible merely based on the fact that
their form is different, to determine that the system and process are eligible, while the product
itself is ineligible. Id.
426. Id. at 222.
427. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. See IBM/Computer Programs, T 1173/97
at 222.
428. TRIPS, supra note 427, art. 27(1) (emphasis added). TRIPS explicitly notes that
"the terms 'inventive step' and 'capable of industrial application' may be deemed by a Mem-
ber to be synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful' respectively." Id. n.5.
429. IBM/Computer Programs, T 1173/97 at 222.
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the European Patent Convention,"43 the Board concluded that it was
"appropriate" to take such international developments into considera-
tion as indicators of "trends" and as contributions to the "highly desir-
able (world-wide) harmonisation of patent law."43 ' Turning to the ap-
plication of article 52 of the EPC, as well as its prior cases,432 the
Board confirmed that the exclusion for computer programs as such
means that computer programs are only excluded from patentability
where they lack a technical character.433 Moreover, the Board con-
firmed that the required technical character cannot be derived from the
physical modifications to computer hardware caused by electrical cur-
rents resulting from running a software program, 43 but rather must be
found either in "further effects" generated by the execution of the pro-
gram (software) in hardware or in the fact that the programming
(software) itself solves a particular technical problem.435 Stated posi-
tively, these two alternatives for finding requisite technical character
mean that
a patent may be granted not only in the case of an invention where a piece
of software manages, by means of a computer, an industrial process or the
working of a piece of machinery, but in every case where a program for a
computer is the only means, or one of the necessary means, of obtaining a
technical effect within the meaning specified above, where, for instance, a
technical effect of that kind is achieved by the internal functioning of a
computer itself under the influence of said program.
436
In the case where patentability is based on the program/software
itself solving a particular technical problem, the Board held that a de-
termination in this regard must be made by examining the program di-
rectly, without reference to any specific characteristics of the com-
430. Id. at 225. With respect to TRIPS, the Board noted that the European Patent Or-
ganization is not a member of the World Trade Organization and was not a signatory to
TRIPS. Id. at 224. Moreover, based on its examination of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, the Board concluded that there was no justification
under the law of treaties to apply TRIPS to the EPC. IBM/Computer Programs, T 1173/97 at
224. In particular, the Board emphasized that the signatory member states to the EPC do not
fully correspond to the signatory member states to TRIPS. Id. With respect to the revised
guidelines of the USPTO and the Japan Patent Office, permitting the patenting of computer
program products, the Board stated that it had "taken due notice of these developments," but
emphasized that the legal situation in Japan and America is different because neither country
has a legal provision analogous to article 52 of the EPC. Id. at 225.
431. See id. at 224-25 (emphasis added).
432. See id. at 226-29.
433. See id. at 226-27.
434. Id. at 227.
435. Id.
436. Id.
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puter system as a whole.437 In other words, the Board seemed to say
that the patentability of computer software, claimed in its own right,
cannot be determined based on the inclusion of hardware elements,
but must instead be determined by examining whether the software
represents a particular solution to a technical problem in the art of
computer programming. If a software program represents a solution
to a technical problem, it possesses the requisite technical character to
merit patent eligibility under article 52, according to the Board.438
Turning to the question of whether "computer program prod-
uct[s]" may be claimed directly, the Board found as a preliminary
matter that the essence of such a claim lies in the program itself, not in
the hardware or the particular medium in which the program is
stored.439 Acknowledging that such a program only shows its effects
"in physical reality when the program is being run" and, thus, that the
program only possesses, at most, the potential to produce a technical
effect; the Board nevertheless found "no good reason for distinguish-
ing between a direct technical effect on the one hand and the potential
to produce a technical effect, which may be considered as an indirect
technical effect, on the other hand."" Therefore, as long as a com-
puter program, when executed, could be viewed as having the requi-
site technical effect, the program itself possesses the potential to pro-
duce the technical effect and is not excluded from patentability under
article 52 of the EPC.44'
Thus, the EPO Boards of Appeal have clearly established that
computer programs may be patentable, regardless of the form in
which they are claimed, as long as they possess a technical character
beyond the normal physical effects of software running in the hard-
ware components of a computer. The most recent EPO Guidelines for
Examination reflect this position. 2 At the same time, however, the
Boards of Appeal have continued to assert that non-technical (for ex-
437. See id. at 227-28.
438. See id. at 227.
439. Id. at 229.
440. Id. at 229-30.
441. See id. at 230. The Board noted that
it would seem illogical to grant a patent for a method but not for the apparatus
adapted for carrying out the same method. By analogy, the present Board finds it
illogical to grant a patent for both a method and the apparatus adapted for carrying
out the same method, but not for the computer program product, which comprises
all the features enabling the implementation of the method and which, when
loaded in a computer, is indeed able to carry out that method.
Id. at 230-31.
442. See EPO Guidelines for Examination, C-IV, § 2.3.6 (2003), available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/gui-lines/e/c-iv236.htm.
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ample, business) applications of computer programs, 443 as well as the
purely "mental act[s]" of computer programmers,"4 are not patentable
under article 52 of the EPC.
In the beginning, similar to the USPTO and the Patent Court of
the United Kingdom, the EPO adopted a point of novelty-like ap-
proach, referred to as a contribution approach, in order to distinguish
excluded non-technical categories of invention from patentable com-
puter programs containing a requisite technical character. 45  Under
this approach, an examiner was instructed to "disregard the form or
kind of claim and concentrate on its content in order to identify the
real contribution which the subject-matter claimed, considered as a
whole, adds to the known art." 46 If this contribution was not found to
be "of a technical character," the claim was to be excluded from pat-
entability as failing to recite an invention within the meaning of article
52.
447
The Boards of Appeal have consistently rejected the contribution
approach as incorrectly blending an investigation of inventive step
with that of patentability. 448 However, in trying to maintain the sepa-
ration of these two levels of analysis, the Boards of Appeal have
tended to introduce a degree of discrimination against method (proc-
ess) claims in favor of apparatus claims. 449 This is a testimonial to the
fundamental difficulty of fully separating the question of invention
from inventive step, particularly where the standard for invention
(technical character) was originally developed in relation to the analo-
gous question of the degree of invention (inventive height). 450
443. See Case T 0931/95, R. v. PBS Partnership/Controlling Pension Benefits Systems,
[2002] E.P.O.R. 52, at 528-29.
Methods only involving economic concepts and practices of doing business are not
inventions within the meaning of Article 52(1) EPC. A feature of a method which
concerns the use of technical means for a purely non-technical purpose and/or for
processing purely non-technical information does not necessarily confer a techni-
cal character to such a method.
Id.
444. See IBM/Computer Programs, T 1173/97 at 232 (discussing System for Generating
Software Source Code/ATr, T 204/93 (unpublished)).
445. See PBS Partnership, T 0931/95 at 530-31; supra notes 129, 173 and 183 and ac-
companying text.
446. PBS Partnership, T 0931/95 at 531 (quoting then-current EPO Guidelines for Ex-
anination, C-I, § 2.2).
447. Id.
448. See id. at 531-32; IBM/Computer Programs, T 1173/97 at 229.
449. See PBS Partnership, T 0931/95 at 528-29, 532-33 (finding method claims to be
patent-ineligible and apparatus claims to be eligible, although lacking an inventive step).
450. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
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Aside from the EPO Boards of Appeal, most of the cases relating
to computer-implemented inventions have been decided by courts in
the United Kingdom and Germany.4"' While it is dangerous to charac-
terize the rapidly evolving jurisprudence in courts and patent offices
of these two nations, it is arguable that the United Kingdom is slightly
more conservative than Germany and the EPO, at least where business
methods are concerned. 452  However, the courts and patent offices of
the United Kingdom and Germany have consistently taken judicial no-
tice of the decisions by the EPO Boards of Appeal and generally adopt
a similar approach to the interpretation of article 52 of the EPC as im-
plemented in domestic law.453 In both of these nations, the question of
patentability of computer-related inventions ultimately turns on
whether a technical contribution can be identified.454
F. The Ill-Fated European Directive: 2000-Present
Despite a striking European consensus that a technical contribu-
tion is key to determining patentability under the EPC and respective
451. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, at 1, 9, COM (2002) 92
final (Feb. 2, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lexlex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/
2002/com2002_0092en01 .pdf [hereinafter Proposed Directive].
452. Compare In re Merrill Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. 561 (C.A. (Civ.)) (Eng.) (holding
that, regardless of any technical advance in computer art, the result of an invention was a
method of doing business and therefore the invention was not patent-eligible) with Automatic
Sales Control, Bundespatentgericht [BPatG] [Federal Patent Court] Jun. 15, 1999 (F.R.G.),
discussed in HART ET AL., supra note 5, at 27 (holding that the technical character of a digital
data processing system made the claims patent-eligible, although they were found to be obvi-
ous and thus a patent was denied).
453. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 17, 2001, 149
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 68 (F.R.G.), translated in R.
v. Re IBM's Patent Application, [2003] EUR. NAT'L PAT. REP. 2, 28 (BGH 2001) (referring to
EPO case law interpreting article 52 of the EPC as part of the literature relevant to an inter-
pretation of the German Patent Law); In re Gale, [1991] R.P.C. 305, 323 (C.A. (Civ.)) (Eng.).
454. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 17, 2001, 149
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 68 (F.R.G.), translated in R.
v. Re IBM's Patent Application, [2003] E.N.P.R. at 27-28 ("[T]he characterising instructions
in the claimed teaching [of a patent application] must solve a specific technical problem. In
these circumstances, the claimed teaching may also be patented if it is to be protected as a
computer program or in any other form which uses a computer."); In re Gale, [1991] R.P.C. at
327.
Computer instructions may represent, for instance, a technical process. What is
recorded in the instructions may be the means for carrying out a technical process
with the aid of a computer. In such a case the process is not barred from pat-
entability by reason of the use of a computer as the medium by which it is carried
out.
Id. For United Kingdom jurisprudence, see In re Fujitsu Ltd., [1996] R.P.C. 511 (Pat.)
(Eng.).
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domestic law, concern over possible divergences in EPC interpretation
relating to "computer-implemented inventions" led the Commission of
the European Communities (European Commission) to propose a Di-
rective on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions
(Proposed Directive) in 2002. 411 The basic intention of the Proposed
Directive was to harmonize the interpretation of article 52, as it relates
to computer-implemented inventions, among European Union mem-
ber states.456 The approach proposed by the European Commission
was to explicitly require a computer-related invention to make a tech-
nical contribution in order to be patentable and to deny patentability to
"pure business methods" and "social processes. '45 The essence of the
Proposed Directive was a requirement that EC member states "ensure
that it is a condition of involving an inventive step that a computer-
implemented invention must make a technical contribution.
458
The legal basis for the Proposed Directive was article 95 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty).459 Article
95 provides for a procedure whereby the European Commission may
propose directives for the harmonization of member state laws in sub-
stantive areas deemed essential to the functioning of a common Euro-
pean "internal market."'  Under this procedure, often referred to as a
"co-decision" procedure, the Commission must submit a proposal to
the European Parliament (Parliament) and the Council of the Euro-
pean Union; however, the European Parliament has the power to
amend or veto.461 Although this procedure has resulted in greater de-
455. See Proposed Directive, supra note 451, at 9.
456. See id. at 11.
457. Id.; see also id. at 14-15.
458. See id. at 14.
459. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. See Proposed Directive, supra note 451, at 12. Article 95 of the EC
Treaty has been the primary basis for harmonizing European Union laws relating to intellec-
tual property. See id. at 12-13; Case C-377/98, Pays-Bas v. Parliament, 2001 E.C.R. 1-7079.
The term "EC Treaty" designates the foundational EEC Treaty, as amended by the TEU and
the 1987 Single European Act, O.J. (L 169) 1. See A Citation Manual for European Commu-
nity Materials, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 694, 696 (1994); supra note 342. The EC Treaty was
significantly amended, and many of its articles were renumbered, by the Treaty of Amsterdam
Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communi-
ties and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Am-
sterdam]. Article 95 was article 100a, prior to amendment of the EC Treaty by the Treaty of
Amsterdam. See Roger J. Goebel, The Treaty of Amsterdam in Historical Perspective, 22
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S7 (1999).
460. See EC Treaty, supra note 459, art. 100a (as in effect in 1997) (now art. 95), avail-
able at http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entr6d05.htm#Article-100a; BERMANN ET AL.,
supra note 295, at 428-31, 439-40.
461. See EC Treaty, supra note 459, art. 189b, available at
http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc.htm; Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Con-
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mocratic legitimacy of European Union legislation, it can be highly
politicized and cumbersome, as evinced by the length of time taken to
enact the Data Protection Directive (five years) 462 and the Biotech Di-
rective (ten years).463 The Proposed Directive was no exception.
In September 2003, the Parliament proposed alternative language
for the Proposed Directive.464 In accordance with the co-decision pro-
cedure, the European Council was faced with the choice either to ac-
cept Parliament's amendments and adopt the Directive or to make
changes.465 In the case of the Proposed Directive, Parliament's
amendments were quite significant and, as it turned out, unacceptable
to the Council. As far as patentability was concerned, Parliament's
proposal did not change the basic approach of looking to whether a
computer-related invention results in a technical contribution in order
to determine patentability.466 Moreover, Parliament's proposal con-
tinued the approach of blending invention with inventive step, as both
are determined by the technical character of the claimed invention.467
However, Parliament's proposal attempted to directly connect techni-
cal character to invention and to define such technical character in a
manner that tethered it to the physical world.468 In addition, Parlia-
ment's proposal provided direct instructions as to how to determine
cepts in Evolution-The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 746, 759-63
(1998).
462. See Patrick J. Murray, Comment, The Adequacy Standard Under Directive
95/46/EC: Does U.S. Data Protection Meet This Standard?, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 932, 955-
58 (1998).
463. See Lydia Nenow, Comment, To Patent or Not to Patent: The European Union's
New Biotech Directive, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 569, 592 (2001).
464. See European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Commission Proposal for
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Patentability of Computer-
Implemented Inventions, COM (2003) 402 (Sept. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Parliament Amend-
ments].
465. See Lenaerts, supra note 461, at 761.
466. See Parliament Amendments, supra note 464, at 15.
("In order to be patentable, a computer-implemented invention must be susceptible of indus-
trial application and new and involve an inventive step. In order to involve an inventive step,
a computer-implemented invention must make a technical contribution.").
467. See id.
468. See id. at 13-14. Changes from Commission's Proposed Directive are italicized:
"technical contribution," also called "invention," means a contribution to the state
of the art in a field of technology. The technical character of the contribution is
one of the four requirements for patentability. Additionally, to deserve a patent,
the technical contribution has to be new, non-obvious, and susceptible of indus-
trial application. The use of natural forces to control physical effects beyond the
digital representation of information belongs to a field of technology. The proc-
essing, handling, and presentation of information do not belong to a field of tech-
nology, even where technical devices are employed for such purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).
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whether a computer-related invention contains a technical contribu-
tion.
In determining whether a given computer-implemented invention makes a
technical contribution, the following test shall be used: whether it consti-
tutes a new teaching on cause-effect relations in the use of controllable
forces of nature and has an industrial application in the strict sense of the
expression, in terms of both method and result.469
Additionally, Parliament's proposal sought to ensure that data
processing would not be treated as a "field of technology," and that
"innovations in the field of data processing [not be] considered to be
inventions within the meaning of patent law. '47°  Furthermore, the
proposal contained an explicit exclusion from patentability in the case
of "computer programs which implement business, mathematical or
other methods and do not produce any technical effects beyond the
normal physical interactions between a program and the computer,
network or other programmable apparatus in which it is run.""47 Fi-
nally, the proposal obligated EC member states to "ensure that com-
puter-implemented solutions to technical problems are not considered
to be patentable inventions merely because they improve efficiency in
the use of resources within the data processing system. ' 472 Thus Par-
liament's proposed amendments sought to tightly constrain interpreta-
tion of the Directive.
On May 18, 2004, the European Council announced a "Political
Agreement on a Common Position, ' 473 meaning that it had decided to
move the co-decision procedure to stage two and to amend Parlia-
ment's proposal.474 On May 24, 2004, the text on which this political
agreement had been based was circulated, and it became apparent that
the Council intended to reject all of Parliament's amendments relating
to patentability.475 On March 7, 2005, following protracted discussion
469. See id. at 15.
470. See id. "Field of technology" was defined as "an industrial application domain
requiring the use of controllable forces of nature to achieve predictable results." Id. at 14. It
was equated with "technical." See id. "Industry" was defined as "the automated production
of material goods." Id.
471. Id. at 16.
472. Id.
473. See Press Release, Council of the European Union, Commission Welcomes Coun-
cil Agreement on Directive on Computer-Implemented Inventions (May 18, 2004),
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/659&format=HTML&age
d=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
474. See Lenaerts, supra note 461, at 761.
475. See generally Political Agreement on the Council's Common Position (EU) No.
9713/04, May 24, 2004, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04
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within the Council, the adoption of the Common Position by qualified
majority was announced.476 On March 9, 2005, the European Com-
mission indicated its acceptance of the Common Position in a com-
munication to Parliament.477 The Common Position generally re-
flected an approach to patentability that was consistent with the
Commission's original proposal.478
As matters then stood, Parliament had the choice either to (1) re-
main silent and therefore accept the Common Position, in which case
the Directive would be deemed adopted under the co-decision proce-
dure; (2) reject by absolute majority, in which case the Directive
would be defeated; or (3) to propose additional amendments.479
Commentators expected Parliament to take action by July, before the
beginning of summer recess.48° In the meantime, interested groups at
both ends of the software patent spectrum battled furiously in the
press, on the web, and through available political venues.481 In the
end, however, these groups appeared to agree that the Directive could
not be enacted in a satisfactory form, and it was defeated.482
The failure of the Directive exposes Europeans' fundamental dis-
agreement as to the meaning of the technical character requirement
and its implications for the patentability of computer programs and
computer-implemented inventions. Clearly, the technical character
requirement is no panacea. It has not prevented European courts from
having to struggle through the analytical thickets of separating ques-
tions of novelty and inventiveness from questions of patentability.483
Nor has it saved such courts from having to extricate themselves from
a reliance on physicality to define technology. 4M Nevertheless, the
technical character requirement has provided European courts with a
/st09/st09713.en04.pdf.
476. See Press Release, Council of the European Union, Adoption of Council's Com-
mon Position on a Directive on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions (Mar.
7, 2005), http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/05/57&format
=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
477. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, COM
(2005) 83 final (Mar. 9, 2005), http://europa.eu.int/eur-lexlex/LexUriServ/site/en/
com/2005/com2005 0083en01 .pdf.
478. See id.
479. Lenaerts, supra note 461, at 761.
480. See Alan Cane, Patently an EU Tangle, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 20, 2005, at 6.
481. See id.
482. See Intellectual Property: European Parliament Buries Software Patents Direc-
tive, supra note 2.
483. See supra notes 390-402, 445-50, 458, 466-68 and accompanying text.
484. Compare supra notes 381-388 and accompanying text with notes 414-419 and ac-
companying text. See also supra notes 468-469.
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patentability meta-jurisprudence that theoretically distinguishes be-
tween technology and the social and cultural arts. According to the
argument presented in this Article, such a meta-jurisprudence is pref-
erable to the current American patentability meta-jurisprudence be-
cause it undertakes the challenging but vitally important task of con-
ceptually separating technology from the realm of human social and
cultural interaction.
V. CONCLUSION
The European Directive on the Patentability of Computer-
Implemented Inventions represents only the most recent and democ-
ratic of attempts to define the nature of patentable technology, as
prompted by the chimerical mind-machine that is the modern, general-
purpose computer. The degree of controversy surrounding the Direc-
tive, given its apparently modest original ambitions, provides a clear
signal that questions concerning the nature of patentable technology
are far from being settled. This should raise significant questions as to
how the nature of patentable technology might, in the future, be le-
gitimately determined in Europe and America, as well as in other na-
tions.485
Faced with the challenge of defining patentable technology, the
American Federal Circuit has defined it expansively, prompting ques-
tions as to whether any limits remain. Such an approach seems to be
based more on expediency than on any real and sustained attempt to
wrestle with the nature of patentable technology or the constitutional
"useful arts." Utilizing Germanic concepts of technical character, on
the other hand, European courts appear to be shaping a definition of
patentable technology that is capable of providing limits without nec-
essarily tying those limits to a physical transformation or analogous
test, which may be open to the criticism that it is unduly dependent on
outdated categories of technology. Only time can show whether these
limits will survive or be sacrificed in the desire to remain competitive
with America.
485. Max Weber defined "legitimacy" as a characteristic that people ascribe to a social
order when, among other traditional possibilities, it is regarded as possessing "legality." See
WEBER, supra note 29, at 31-37. According to Weber, where such legality does not derive
from voluntary agreement of all participants in a social order, it can only depend on the de-
gree to which persons imposing it are regarded as possessing authority to do so and behave in
a manner that is formally correct. See id. at 37.
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Differentiating between the social and cultural aspects of human
endeavor, and the technology of which human beings make use and
seek constantly to improve, has unquestionably become difficult in
our computer-dominated era. However, such differentiation has never
been easy. The ancient and medieval alchemists made no such dis-
tinctions, viewing physical transformation as only part of the spiritual
transformation of a human being. 86 It may be the case that values of
openness and authorial transmission of knowledge (science), com-
bined with clearer differentiation between the means and ends of hu-
man endeavor, were partially responsible for the period of rapid tech-
nological development that began in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.487 If so, it would be unfortunate to lightly discard such val-
ues and differentiations precisely at the moment when called upon to
face the Chimera.
486. See LONG, supra note 27, at 63-71, 144-48.
487. Cf id. at 176-91, 243-50 (chronicling fifteenth and sixteenth century developments
in writings concerning techniques of mining and metallurgy, many of which were critical of
the alchemists for their secrecy and esotericism, and arguing that such writings evidence a
validation stage in the development of technological knowledge, which enabled knowledge of
techniques and technology to attain a more elevated status and thus to contribute to the "sci-
entific revolution").
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